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Relation-based category learning is based on very different principles than feature-based 
category learning. It has been shown that relational categories are learned by a process 
akin to structured intersection discovery, which is formally powerful than feature-based 
associative learning, but which fails catastrophically with probabilistic category 
structures. This research provided consistent evidence that relational concepts are 
qualitatively different from featural concepts, and they are also learned in a qualitatively 
different manner. Experiment 1 showed that relational category learning with 
probabilistic structures can be improved by comparing systematic pairs of exemplars, 
where shared relations between the exemplars can be abstracted. Experiment 2 showed 
that comparing the exemplars to the prototype can improve learners’ ability to learn 
probabilistic relational categories in terms of prototype-plus-exception rules. Experiment 
3 and 4 examined further the distinction between feature-and relation-based category 
learning using a dual task methodology. Experiment 3 revealed that featural category 
learning was more impaired by a visuospatial dual task than by a verbal dual task, 
whereas relational category learning was more impaired by the verbal dual task. 
Experiment 4 examined how the dual task that involves more relational information 
interacts with feature-and relation-based category learning. The results showed that there 
was no reliable difference between two category learning. Taken together, Experiment 3 
and 4 results suggest that in contrast to featural category learning, which may involve 
mainly non-verbal mechanisms, relational category learning appears to place greater 
demands on more explicit and attention-demanding verbal or verbally-related learning 
mechanisms. The findings presented in this dissertation contribute to the growing body of 
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theoretical and empirical results suggesting that relational thought is a qualitatively 
different thing than the kinds of thinking and learning afforded by feature-based 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The ability to acquire and reason about relational concepts is a cornerstone of 
human thinking. It is the basis of our ability to grasp analogies between seemingly 
different objects or situations (e.g., Bassok, 2001; Clement & Gentner, 1991; Gentner, 
1983; Gentner & Smith, 2013; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Goswami, 2001; Holyoak, 2005; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Markman & Gentner, 2000), to infer hidden causes of 
observed events (e.g., Gopnik & Melzoff, 1997; Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 
2001), to apply abstract rules in novel situations (e.g., Smith, Langston & Nisbett, 1992), 
and even to appreciate perceptual similarities (e.g., Palmer, 1978; Goldstone, Medin & 
Gentner, 1991; Hummel, 2000; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996). Along with language, our 
capacity to think explicitly about relations may be the primary factor separating human 
cognition from the cognitive abilities of our closest primate cousins (see, e.g., Penn, 
Holyoak & Povinelli, 2008). 
Relational concepts are concepts that specify the relations between things rather 
than just the literal features of the things themselves: A barrier is something that stands 
between one thing and another; a conduit is something that transports something else 
(water, electricity, karma) from one place to another; a friend is someone who likes and is 
liked by another. Although it is tempting to think of nouns as referring to concrete objects 
defined by simple lists of features (e.g., “a bird has feathers and wings and lives in 
trees”)—and although, as reviewed shortly, the vast majority of laboratory research on 
category learning has been based on such feature-based categories—about half of 100 
highest-frequency nouns in the British National Corpus refer to relational concepts 
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(Asmuth & Gentner, 2005). Relational categories may thus be more the rule than the 
exception. 
Given the centrality of relational concepts in human thinking, it is important to 
understand what such concepts consist of and how they are acquired—and the degree to 
which the answer to the first question imposes constraints on the answer to the second. In 
this Dissertation, I shall explore several empirical implications of the intersection 
discovery hypothesis: The hypothesis that relational concepts are learned by a process of 
structural alignment (a.k.a. analogical mapping; Gentner, 1983; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
1983), which makes explicit the relational correspondences between otherwise featurally 
different examples, combined with a form of intersection discovery, in which the shared 
elements and relations between those systems are retained while elements or relations 
unique to one system or the other are discarded (Doumas, Hummel & Sandhofer, 2008; 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). As a learning algorithm, intersection 
discovery is both formally more powerful than associative learning (e.g., as discussed in 
the literature on animal learning [e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972] and in traditional 
models of category learning in human subjects [e.g., Krushke, 1992]) and, in 
counterintuitive ways, more limited in the kinds of category structures it is equipped to 
acquire. 
The Dissertation is organized as follows. I shall first review evidence for various 
kinds of relational concepts in human cognition. I next discuss the problem of learning 
relational concepts from examples. I will argue that such concepts are formally too 
complex to be acquired by means of traditional associative learning. I will present the 
intersection discovery hypothesis as a potential solution to the limitations of associative 
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learning and summarize prior support for that hypothesis. The main part of the 
Dissertation consists of four experiments testing additional predictions of the intersection 
discovery hypothesis, and the implications of concept acquisition qua relational learning 
more generally. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of my 
findings for our understanding of relational concepts and the conditions under which they 
can and cannot be learned. 
1.1. Prior research on relational categories 
Although relational concepts are ubiquitous in human cognition, it would be a 
mistake to assume that “relational concept” is a monolithic term. Instead, relational 
concepts appear to manifest themselves in several more specific ways in human cognition. 
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties. Barr and Caplan (1987; Caplan & Barr, 1991) 
made a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic features. Intrinsic features are those 
that belong to an entity in isolation, such as “has wings” for birds, whereas extrinsic (i.e., 
relational) properties refer to relations between two or more entities, such as “used to 
work with” for a hammer. In Barr and Caplan’s experiments (1987), participants in a 
pilot study were asked to list members of categories consisting of natural kinds and 
artifacts. Barr and Caplan then asked another group of participants to rate on a 1…7 scale 
the degree to which each of the category members collected from the pilot study had 
intrinsic or extrinsic properties. The results showed that artifacts (such as toys, tools, 
weapons, vehicles, sports, and furniture) were more defined by extrinsic features whereas 
natural kinds (such as trees, fruit, mammals, birds, and flowers) were more defined by 
intrinsic features. Barr and Caplan (1987) also reported partial membership scores, which 
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were responses not falling on either endpoint of the membership scale. That is, on their 
scale, any response from 2 to 6 was scored as partial membership. They found that higher 
proportion of participants provided partial membership judgments about the members of 
extrinsic categories, and concluded that extrinsic concepts show more graded 
membership than intrinsic concepts. 
Isolated vs. Interrelated Concepts. Goldstone (1996) and his colleagues (e.g., 
Goldstone, Steyvers, & Rogosky, 2003) explored a number of metrics for measuring the 
degree to which a concept is isolated (i.e., featural) or highly interrelated with other 
concepts (i.e., relational). Goldstone (1996) argued that relatively interrelated concepts 
can be identified by the minimul use of nondiagnostic features and more by a caricature 
than a prototype. In the first experiment, the stimuli were 3 x 3 grid line segments 
consisting of horizontal, vertical, and diagonal lines. Participants in the isolated condition 
were instructed to create an image of the two concepts to be learned. Participants in the 
interrelated condition were instructed to seek out stimulus features that served to 
distinguish the concepts. He found that nondiagnostic line segments did not have much 
influence on categorization accuracy in the interrelated condition relative to diagnostic 
lines. In contrast, nondiagnostic line segments had a greater influence in the isolated 
condition.  
Another experiment presented participants with four categories, each consisting of 
seven vertical bars (resembling a histogram). Each category included a prototype and a 
caricature. The prototype was defined as the exemplar that presented average values 
along the dimensions that comprise the category’s members, whereas a caricature was 
defined as an extreme exemplar, specifically, an exemplar that presented values that 
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departed from the central tendency of the category in the opposite direction of the central 
tendency of other, simultaneously acquired categories (Goldstone, et al., 2003). Given 
that accuracy rates were above 90%, the main interest was response time. Categorizing 
caricatures was generally faster than categorizing prototypes. This speed advantage was 
particularly pronounced when participants was instructed to discriminate features. 
Participants in the interrelated condition whose task was to seek out stimulus features that 
served to distinguish the concepts showed faster performance when categorizing 
caricatures than prototypes. By contrast, participants in the isolated condition whose task 
was to create an image of the two concepts to be learned did not show the caricature 
advantage. Together, these findings suggest that isolated (i.e., featural) categories may be 
better characterized by prototypes than by ideals or caricatures, whereas interrelated (i.e., 
relational) categories may be better characterized by ideals or caricatures than by 
prototypes (see also Kittur et al., 2006b). 
Natural Kinds vs. Nominal Kinds. Kloos and Sloutsky (2004) made a distinction 
between natural kind concepts, which have dense correlational structures and nominal 
kind concepts, which are based on sparse rule-like structures. They investigated how 
people learn natural and nominal categories using artificial stimuli. Members of natural 
categories had a set of correlated features in common, whereas members of nominal 
categories had a single relation in common. Participants were asked to learn a category 
by observation with many instances of the category or by a rule-like definition such as 
category members have relation X. The results showed that observation is a better way to 
learn natural categories, whereas discovering an explicit rule is a better way to learn 
nominal categories. Their findings suggest that a difference in representational density 
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needs different category learning regimes: Dense concepts are learned better in a more 
implicit (observation-based) way, whereas sparse ones are learned better in a more 
explicit (rule-based) way. This distinction also suggests that entity and relational 
categories rely, not only on different kinds of mental representations, but also on different 
kinds of learning algorithms.   
 Role-governed categories. Markman and his colleagues (Markman & Stilwell, 
2001; Goldwater, Markman & Stilwell, 2011) have argued that, unlike featural categories 
in which labels refer to categories defined by their members’ features, role-governed 
categories are defined by items that play particular roles in a more global relational 
structure. Examples include categories such as doctor, advisor, private (the military rank), 
and so on. Those examples are certainly composed of features in some way, but rather it 
is the relational information that separates role-governed from feature-based categories, 
not specific features. Goldwater et al. (2011) provided empirical evidence to support the 
existence of role-governed categories. They showed that our knowledge of role-governed 
categories, in contrast to feature-based categories, is largely about properties extrinsic to 
category members. They also showed that, when asked to choose words to describe 
feature-based categories, people tend to choose words describing typical category 
characteristics; but when asked to choose words describing role-governed categories, 
people tend to choose words describing ideal characteristics (see also Goldstone, 1996; 
Kittur, et al., 2006b).  
In addition, Goldwater and Markman (2011) examined factors that increase 
people’s sensitivity to role-governed categories. In a novel-word extension study, a triad 
consisted of one target category, a role-governed alternate and a thematic alternate (e.g., 
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“bird’s nest” for a target word, “house” for a role-governed alternate, and “tree” for a 
thematic alternate). On each trial, participants were given either a label or a description 
for the exemplars. In the label condition, the query was, for example, “The target is a 
goppin. Which of these other two is better called goppin?” In the description condition, 
the query would be “It’s a goppin target. Which of these other two is better called 
goppin?”. The results showed that participants in the label condition chose role matches 
more frequently than participants in the description condition. Goldwater and Markman 
interpreted this result to indicate that labels induce analogical comparison (Gentner, 
2003; Namy & Gentner, 2002; Yamauchi, 2009), which aligns elements on the basis of 
common relational roles.  
In their next study, half of the participants were provided a similarity rating task 
followed by a categorization task, and the other half were provided an imageability rating 
task followed by a categorization task. For the similarity rating task, the target and one of 
the alternates were presented (the role-matched alternate or the thematic matched one). 
The query was, “How similar are the target and alternative 1? How similar are the target 
and alternative 2?” Similarly, for the imageability task, the target and one of two 
alternates (role-match or thematic-match) were presented and the participant was asked, 
“Which is easier to picture in your head: the target or one alternative 1? “Which is easier 
to picture in your head: the target or one alternative 2?” The categorization task then was 
provided to all participants. The query was “which of these two better go with target to 
make a category?” The results showed that participants in the similarity condition chose 
more often the role-matched alternative than participants in the imageability condition, 
which does not require a comparison of the elements of the mental representation of the 
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concepts. Taken together, these findings suggest that similarity comparisons as well as 
labels create a general sensitivity to role-governed categories that persist beyond the 
specific items on which the judgments were made.  
 Ad-hoc Categories. Barsalou's (1983, 1985) ad-hoc categories are categories 
constructed spontaneously to achieve a goal, such as "things to take out of the house 
during a fire". The members of this category, which include things such as cash, pets, 
family photos, laptops, and so forth, typically lack any intrinsic (i.e., featural) similarity. 
The only “feature” the members of this category have in common is that they are all 
things to take out of the house in case of fire. In contrast to the members of feature-based 
categories, which have a graded structure around a central tendency (i.e., the prototype), 
ad-hoc categories show a graded structure around an ideal (properties that optimally 
promote goal resolution) as in the example of foods with no calories for “things to eat on 
a diet”. The centrality of a specific goal suggests that relational category representations 
may have a relatively sparse, rule-like nature (e.g., see also Kittur et al., 2004; Kittur et 
al., 2006b; Kloos & Sloutsky, 2004). 
Abstract Coherent Categories. Rehder and Ross (2001) proposed that a kind of 
relational category they called abstract coherent categories can be acquired on the basis 
of relationships that are independent of the specific attributes of exemplars, as long as the 
relationships are maintained in a way consistent with prior expectations. In their study, 
three exemplars of the abstract coherent category “morkels” were presented: one morkel 
“operates on the surface of water, works to absorb spilled oil, coated with spongy 
material,” while another “operates on land, works to gather harmful solids, has a shovel”. 
The members of this category lack featural overlap but take their structure from systems 
9 
 
of features that support a common abstract relation (i.e., that a morkel’s features work 
sensibly together to satisfy a goal). They argued that the human conceptual system is 
closely related to abstract coherent concepts.  
Thematic Relations. Thematic relations can be also seen as yet another kind of 
relational category. A thematic relation is generally defined as any temporal, spatial, 
causal or functional relation between things that perform complementary roles in the 
same scenario (Estes, Golonka & Jones, 2011, Golonka & Estes, 2009; Lin & Murphy, 
2001; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999). Examples of thematic relations include the relation 
between cows and milk and the relation between bagels and cream cheese. Thematic 
relations are external in that they occur between multiple objects, concepts, people or 
events and complementary in the sense that the arguments of a thematic relation fill 
complementary roles of the relation (e.g., cows are producers and their milk is the 
products; Estes et al., 2011). In this way, the arguments of a thematic relation differ from 
members of an ad-hoc category: There is no sense in which the members of an ad-hoc 
category are bound to complementary roles. The sense in which thematic relations form 
(typically very small) categories is that the arguments of a thematic relation can be 
viewed as the “members” of the category. 
1.2. What are relations? 
In spite of the diversity of these different kinds of concepts, they all share the 
property that they are defined, not by the literal features of their exemplars, but by 
relations, either between the features of an individual exemplar or between the exemplar 
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and other objects (including the person doing the categorizing). In this context, it is 
important to say what a relation is. 
Formally, a relation is a subset of the Cartesian product of two or more 
(potentially) infinite sets. Consider the set of integers and imagine an infinite table, with 
both columns and rows labeled with the integers, 0…0 (the table extends forever to the 
right and to the bottom). In the cells of the matrix, insert a value of 1 (i.e., true) if the 
integer in the corresponding row is larger than the integer in the corresponding column 
and insert the value 0 (i.e., false) otherwise. The result is an infinitely large table with 1s 
below the main diagonal and 0s everywhere else; this table is the mathematical definition 
of the relation larger-than (row, column). 
Intuitively, a relation (or, more precisely, a relational role) is a property of an 
object (e.g., an integer) whose truth value is impossible to establish without reference to 
at least one other object: The number 42 cannot simply be larger or smaller; it can only 
be larger or smaller than some other number. (Note that this fact is manifest in the 
mathematical definition of a relation.) Similarly, in the statement “John gave the book to 
Mary”, John is not simply a giver; he is the giver of a book to Mary. 
From this formal perspective, almost every concept satisfies the definition of a 
relation. For example, even the response of a ganglion cell in the retina express a relation 
between the amount of light on one spot on the retina and the amount of light on an 
adjacent spot. This fact has given rise to some confusion in the literature about what 
constitutes a “relational representation” (see, e.g., Hummel, 2010, for a discussion).  
From a psychological perspective—and for the purposes of this Dissertation—a 
representation is relational if and only if it makes the relation in question explicit, that is, 
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if some element of the representation corresponds specifically to the relation, 
independently of whatever arguments it happens to be taking at the time (see Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1998; Doumas, et al., 2008). According to this definition, the expression “loves 
(John, Mary)” is explicitly relational because it represents the relation loves 
independently of its arguments (e.g., as evidenced by our ability to evaluate what loves 
(John, Mary) has in common with, and differs from, loves (Mary, John) or loves (Bill, 
Susan)). The ganglion cell, by contrast, is not explicitly relational because a different cell 
is required for every different possible contrast on the retina; that is, the “relation” 
represented by a ganglion cell (i.e., a local contrast value) is not independent of its 
arguments (the photoreceptors representing the luminance values giving rise to that 
contrast).  
In turn, the requirement that relations be represented independently of their 
arguments implies that there must be some basis for specifying dynamically (i.e., on the 
fly) which arguments any given relation happens to be taking at any given time. In the 
case of propositional notation, this “binding tag” is list position within the parentheses 
(e.g., in loves (John, Mary), the binding of John to lover is specified by his first position 
in the parentheses). From a psychological perspective, what is important is that this kind 
of dynamic binding (whatever the “tag” happens to be at, say, a neural level) requires 
attention and consumes finite working memory resources. As elaborated shortly, the 
resulting demands on attention and working memory are among the major hallmarks of 





1.3. A learning algorithm for relational concepts 
Given the many kinds of relational categories, an important question is how such 
concepts are acquired: How do we come to know what a barrier is, or what larger-than 
means? This question is complicated by the fact that, by adulthood at least, many of our 
relational concepts are independent of (i.e., invariant with) their arguments (Doumas et 
al., 2008; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003): We understand that larger-than means the 
same thing in the statement “Jupiter is larger than Saturn” as in the statement “The 
nucleus of an atom is larger than the electrons”, even though Jupiter and Saturn are very 
different than atomic nuclei and electrons.  
This kind of argument-invariance poses a difficulty for learning because, although 
we eventually come to understand relations as distinct from their arguments, we never 
actually get to experience relations disembodied from their arguments: No one has ever 
seen an instance of larger-than without some specific thing that was larger than some 
specific other thing. The argument-invariance of relational concepts poses a problem for 
learning because it implies that associative learning is formally too weak to explain the 
acquisition of relational concepts (Chomsky, 1959; see also Doumas et al., 2008; 
Hummel, 2010; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Kittur, Hummel & Holyoak, 2004), a 
fact that may help to explain why so few species are capable of learning relational 
concepts.  
The reason, in brief, is that associative learning is tied to the co-occurrence 
statistics of the features of the concepts so acquired. If, in a category learning experiment 
using artificial “bugs” as stimuli, a given head type, H, occurs 75% of the time with a 
given category label, C, then it is possible to learn associatively that H predicts C. 
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Relations, by contrast, cannot be predicted based strictly on co-occurrence. We know, for 
example, that a neon atom is larger than an electron even if we have never explicitly 
considered this comparison before. What is worse is that any co-occurrence statistics a 
person has had the opportunity to observe may contradict whatever relation(s) in which 
an object currently stands: A neon atom is smaller than everything else with which the 
average person ever has any experience, so according to co-occurrence statistics alone it 
is impossible to even imagine its being larger than anything.  
In response to the inadequacy of associative learning to explain the acquisition of 
relational concepts, some researchers have proposed that relational concepts, including 
both full-blown schemas (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003) and 
individual relations, such as larger-than (e.g., Doumas et al., 2008), are learned by a 
process of structured intersection discovery. The basic idea is that two situations—e.g., 
two love triangles, in the case of a love triangle schema (see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), 
or two instances of one thing being larger than another, in the case of the larger-than 
relation (see Doumas, et al., 2008)—are structurally aligned (Gentner, 1983), making the 
correspondences between their parts explicit. For example, in the case of the love triangle 
schema, the learner may observe two instances of a love triangle (e.g., John loves Mary, 
but Mary loves Bill, so John is jealous of Bill, and Jill loves Mike, but Mike loves Betty, 
so Jill is jealous of Betty), notice the analogy between them (mapping John to Jill, Mary 
to Mike and Bill to Betty) and induce a schema by discovering the intersection of the two 
examples, that is, retaining the things they have in common and discarding the details on 
which they differ (in this case, person1 loves person2, person2 loves person3, so person1 
is jealous of person3). Learning by intersection discovery is formally more powerful than 
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simple associative learning because it relies on the machinery of structural alignment, i.e., 
analogy (see Doumas, et al., 2008; Gentner, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), making it 
sensitive to the abstract (including higher-order) relational structure of the concepts being 
compared. 
In contrast to relational concepts, which are too complex to learn as simple 
associations (because of the argument invariance property), featural concepts (i.e., 
concepts defined by their exemplars’ features, rather than by relations) can be learned 
associatively. For example, if members of category X tend to have features A1, B1 and 
C1, whereas members of category Y tend to have features A2, B2 and C2, then it is 
possible to discriminate Xs from Ys simply by learning associative links (e.g., weighted 
connections in a connectionist network, or associative links as learned by the Rescorla-
Wagner [1973] model) from A1, B1 and C1 to X and from A2, B2 and C2 to Y. That is, 
there is good reason to believe that relational and featural concepts require very different 
learning algorithms: Intersection discovery (or some other algorithm that exploits the 
machinery of structure mapping) in the case of relational concepts vs. simple association 
in the case of featural concepts (Hummel, 2010; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). 
To the extent that different learning algorithms underlie the learning of relational 
and featural concepts, then conclusions drawn from experiments using one kind of 
category may not necessarily apply to the other kind. One of the most robust and 
replicable conclusions from the literature on category learning from the 1970s to the 
present (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999; Markman & Maddox, 2003; 
Minda & Smith, 2011; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Shiffrin & Styvers, 1997; Smith & Medin, 
1981) is that people easily learn categories with a family resemblance, i.e., probabilistic 
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structure. In a category with a family resemblance structure, there is no single feature 
shared by all members of the category. Rather, features tend to occur probabilistically, 
and “good” members of the category (i.e., members closer to the prototype) tend to have 
more features in common with other members of the category than “bad” members. The 
observation that people easily learn categories with a family resemblance structure leads 
naturally to the conclusion that our natural concepts also have a family resemblance 
structure, as famously suggested by Wittgenstein (1953).  
However, as observed by Kittur and colleagues (Kittur, Holyoak, & Hummel, 
2006b; Kittur, Hummel, & Holyoak, 2004), one limitation of this conclusion is that all 
the experiments demonstrating our ability to learn probabilistic category structures have 
been performed using feature-based categories. If feature-based categories are learned 
associatively, then they should be easily learnable even if they have a probabilistic 
structure (provided the features are sufficiently predictive of category membership). But 
if relational categories defy learning by association—and in particular, if they are learned 
by a process akin to structured intersection discovery—then they should not be learnable 
when they have a family resemblance structure: If there is no relation that all members of 
a relational category have in common, then the intersection of the category’s exemplars 
will be the empty set. That is, the intersection-discovery theory of relational learning 
predicts that probabilistic relational categories ought to be (virtually) unlearnable. 
1.4. Kittur, Hummel and Holyoak (2004) 
Kittur et al. (2004) set out to explicitly test the prediction that probabilistic 
relational categories ought to be difficult to learn. Each exemplar in their experiments 
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consisted of an octagon and a square. In the relational condition of this experiment, the 
prototypes of A and B were defined by the relations between the octagon and the square. 
In the prototype of category A, the octagon was larger than the square (‘1’), darker than 
the square (‘1’), above the square (‘1’) and in front of the square (‘1’). In the prototype of 
B, it was smaller than the square (‘0’), lighter than the square (‘0’) below the square (‘0’) 
and behind the square (‘0’). The precise size and darkness (i.e., features) of the octagon 
and square did not matter for category membership and were allowed to vary across 
exemplars within a category. In the featural condition of this experiment, A and B were 
defined by the precise size and darkness of the octagon and square.  
Orthogonally crossed with the relational vs. featural conditions, half the 
participants learned family resemblance (a.k.a., probabilistic) category structures and the 
other half learned deterministic category structures. In the family resemblance condition, 
exemplars were constructed from the prototypes by switching one relation or feature in 
the prototype to its value in the opposite prototype, as in the example above. (For 
example, if the prototype of category is denoted [1,1,1,1] and the prototype of B is 
[0,0,0,0], then the four exemplars of A would be [0,1,1,1], [1,0,1,1], [1,1,0,1] and 
[1,1,1,0]. Note that, although any given exemplar contains ¾ of the corresponding 
prototype’s features/relations, no exemplar contains all of the prototype’s 
features/relations, and no feature/relation appears in all the prototypes of a category. It is 
in this sense that the category has a “family resemblance” or “probabilistic” structure.) 
The deterministic condition was constructed from the probabilistic condition simply by 
discarding one exemplar (counterbalanced) from each category, so that one feature or 
relation was perfectly (i.e., deterministically) predictive of category membership. For 
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example, discarding the first exemplar of each category leaves exemplars [1,0,1,1], 
[1,1,0,1] and [1,1,1,0] for A and [0,1,0,0], [0,0,1,0] and [0,0,0,1] for B, so that the first 
relation (or feature) is deterministically ‘1’ across all members of A and ‘0’ across  
all members of B. 
Kittur et al. (2004) found that although the feature-based categories were easy for 
participants to learn whether they were deterministic or probabilistic, and although 
relational categories were easy to learn as long as they were deterministic, relational 
categories were extremely difficult to learn when they were probabilistic. Indeed, half 
their participants never learned the probabilistic relational categories, even after 600 
exposures to the exemplars.  
Their findings support the hypothesis that people learn relational concepts by a 
process of intersection discovery (Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), in which they compare 
examples of relational concepts to one another, retaining what the examples have in 
common and discarding or discounting the details on which they differ. In the case of a 
probabilistic category structure, the intersection is the empty set, rendering the category 
unlearnable. Thus, although Hummel and Holyoak (2003) and Doumas, et al. (2008) 
showed that intersection discovery is capable of learning complex, relational concepts, it 
fails catastrophically when those concepts have a probabilistic structure. This finding has 






1.5. Jung and Hummel (2009a, 2009b): Rendering probabilistic 
relational categories learnable 
Jung and Hummel (2009a) sought to further test the intersection discovery 
account of relational learning by examining the conditions under which probabilistic 
relational categories could be made learnable. Murphy and Allopenna (1994) and Rehder 
and Ross (2001) showed that category structures that map onto learner’s existing schemas 
are easier to acquire than those that do not. Accordingly, Jung and Hummel reasoned that, 
faced with the task of learning probabilistic relational categories, anything that 
encourages the learner to discover a higher-order relation that remains invariant over 
members of a category—effectively rendering the category deterministic—ought to 
substantially facilitate learning. 
Jung and Hummel (2009a) used a category structure isomorphic to that of Kittur 
et al. (2004), except that instead of octagons and squares, they used circles and squares. 
In all conditions of their first experiment, participants were trained on the (unlearnable) 
probabilistic relational category structure used by Kittur et al. (2004). In one condition, 
participants were instructed to categorize the stimuli as members of A or B (just as in 
Kittur et al.). In another condition, participants were instructed, not to categorize the 
stimuli, but to press the A key “if the circle was winning” in a given stimulus or the B 
key “if the square was winning”. Participants were not told what “winning” meant; rather, 
they were told that they would figure it out as they went along. Crucially, any stimulus 
that a participant in the categorize condition would correctly categorize as an A was a 
stimulus for which a participant in the “who’s winning” condition would correctly say 
“the circle is winning”; and any stimulus correctly categorized as a B was one in which 
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“the square was winning”. That is, the “categorize” and “who’s winning” tasks were fully 
isomorphic, differing only in the instructions participants received at the beginning of the 
experiment, and thus in the task participants believed themselves to be performing. 
The result was that participants in the categorize condition, just like Kittur et al.’s 
participants, had tremendous difficulty learning the category structures, with fewer than 
half of them ever learning to criterion. By contrast, participants in the “who’s winning” 
condition learned much faster, with all of them reaching criterion well before the end of 
the experiment. That is, the “who’s winning” task rendered the otherwise unlearnable 
probabilistic relational category structure learnable.  
A series of follow-up experiments (Jung & Hummel, 2009b) systematically 
investigated the reasons for and nature of this effect, and the short story is that the “who’s 
winning” task seems to engage people’s knowledge of winning/losing relations, thereby 
making them tolerant of the probabilistic structure of the categories. People know that for 
a team to win it is not necessary for that team to get all the points; it is only necessary for 
them to get more points than the other team. Switching the task from “categorize” to 
“who’s winning?” thus seems to have allowed participants in the “who’s winning” 
condition to discover a higher-order property (namely, something like “has more points”) 
that does indeed remain invariant over all members of a category: In every member of 
category A, the circle “has more points” than the square, and in every member of B, the 
square “has more points” than the circle. These data are thus consistent with the idea that 
relational learning (via intersection discovery) requires some kind of invariant (in this 
case, “has more points”) in order to succeed. 
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How does the who’s winning task help intersection discovery in the probabilistic 
relational category learning situation? Jung and Hummel (2009b) hypothesized two 
possibilities: the comparison hypothesis and the winning schema itself hypothesis. The 
first hypothesis was that the who’s winning task facilitates learning simply by 
encouraging participants to compare the circle and square in some manner that the 
category learning task does not. For example, perhaps participants in the who’s winning 
condition represented the circle and square as separate objects and doing so facilitated 
learning by encouraging them to compare them to one another. On this account, any task 
that encourages participants to represent the circle and square as separate objects engaged 
in a relation (like winning/losing) ought to facilitate learning. For example, asking 
participants “who’s daxier?” should encourage the same kind of comparison as “who’s 
winning?” and result in a comparable improvement over “to which category does this 
example belong?”.  
Their second hypothesis was that a schema for what “winning” consists of may 
facilitate learning by encouraging participants to count the number of “winning” roles 
(i.e., “points”) bound to the circle and the square and to declare whichever part has more 
winning roles the winner. On this account, the effect of “who’s winning” reflects the 
operation of the “winning” schema, per se, rather than simply the effect of comparisons 
encouraged by instructions that suggest the circle and square are separate objects.  
Where these hypotheses make divergent predictions is in the potential role of 
consistent vs. mixed role assignment in the effect. In Jung and Hummel’s (2009a) 
experiment, the assignment of relational roles to categories was consistent, in the sense 
that all the roles named in the instructions were assigned to the circle in category A (with 
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the unnamed roles assigned to the square) and all the roles not named in the instructions 
were assigned to the circle in category B (with the named roles assigned to the square). 
That is, given category A, all the relational roles named in the experimental 
instructions— specifically, darker, larger, above, and in front—correspond to the circle, 
and all the unnamed roles (smaller, lighter, below, and behind) correspond to the square. 
In category B, the opposite role-bindings hold.  
Perhaps naming darker, larger, above and in front somehow marks them as the 
“winning” roles, leaving lighter, smaller, below and behind to be the “losing” roles. If so, 
then to the extent that the effect is due to the involvement of the “winning” schema, per 
se, then having the roles consistent with categories (i.e., such that the “winning” shape is 
the one with the most named [i.e., “winning”] roles) ought to lead to faster learning than 
having the roles mixed across the “winning” and “losing” shapes (e.g., such that the 
“winning” shape that the one that has 3/4 of larger and in front [named, “winning” roles] 
and lighter and below [unnamed, “losing” roles]). By contrast, to the extent that the effect 
of “who’s winning” simply reflects the role of comparison, then consistent vs. mixed role 
assignment should make little difference to the rate of learning. A third possibility, of 
course, is that both hypotheses are correct, in which case we would expect to see 
facilitatory effects of both comparison (i.e., “who’s daxier?” vs. “what category?”) and, 
in the case of “who’s winning?” role assignment.  
The results were consistent with both the hypothesized explanations of the effect 
of “who’s winning” in Jung and Hummel (2009b). Participants in the who’s daxier 
condition took reliably fewer trials to reach criterion than those in the categorize 
condition, but those in the who’s winning condition took reliably fewer still. There was 
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also a reliable difference of role assignment in the only who’s winning condition: As 
expected, participants in the consistent conditions reached criterion faster than those in 
the mixed conditions.  
The fact that who’s daxier resulted in faster learning than categorize in both the 
consistent and mixed conditions is consistent with the hypothesis that who’s winning (like 
who’s daxier) encourages participants to compare the circle and square in a way that 
categorization does not. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that participants 
in the mixed winning condition performed similarly to those in the daxier condition and 
better than those in the categorize condition. At the same time, the fact that participants 
in the consistent winning condition learned faster than those in either the mixed winning 
or daxier conditions is consistent with a winning-schema-specific effect. Together, Jung 
and Hummel (2009b)’s results suggest that an effective way to help people learn 
relational categories with a probabilistic structure is to recast the learning task in a form 
that encourages them to discover a higher-order relation that remains invariant over 
members of a category.  
However, there are still at least two additional differences between who’s winning 
and who’s daxier that could account for the superior performance in the former condition: 
First, the difference between the question “who’s winning?” is simply more meaningful 
than “who’s daxier?”—a difference that could somehow have led to better performance 
in who’s winning. Second, the two roles of the winning/losing relation have opposite 
valence. Perhaps it is something about relational roles with opposite valence, rather than 
winning per se, that encourages participants to invoke a schema that facilitates the 
discovery of an invariant higher-order relation with our stimuli. 
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In order to clarify the additional residual questions, the tasks “which one would 
Britney Spears like?” and “which one comes from Nebraska?” were added in addition to 
the previous tasks. The former task was assumed to encourage participants to think of the 
circle and square as separate objects, like who’s winning and who’s daxier. And like 
who’s winning, but unlike who’s daxier, its roles have opposite valence (presumably it is 
“good” to be liked by Britney and bad not to be liked by her) and it has meaning. The 
latter task shares the comparative property of winning, daxier and Britney and it has 
semantic content, like winning and Britney, but presumably lacks strong differences in 
valence across its roles (i.e., it is presumably neither particularly good nor particularly 
bad to be from Nebraska).  
When Jung and Hummel (2009b) crossed the five learning conditions 
orthogonally with consistent vs. mixed role assignment, they found that which one would 
Britney Spears like is equivalent to who’s winning, and Nebraska is equivalent to daxier. 
That is, like the winning and Britney, the learning conditions separating circle from 
square, having roles with opposite valence, and having semantic content may be more 
likely to guarantee discovering a higher-order invariant and thus facilitate learning. 
Missing of any of these elements, however, seems to have a detrimental influence on 
category learning with a probabilistic structure. 
In conclusion, Jung and Hummel (2009a, 2009b)’s findings are consistent with 
the hypothesis that learning relational categories is greatly facilitated by the discovery of 
an abstract invariant that holds true across all members of a category. As such, the data 
support the idea that relational category learning may entail a process of schema 
induction by intersection discovery in the mind of the learner.  
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1.6. Overview of experimental approach 
 While Jung and Hummel’s (2009a, b) findings replicated and extended the 
findings of Kittur et al., providing additional evidence that relational categories are 
learned by a process of schema induction, and that this algorithm makes it very difficult 
for people to learn relational categories with a probabilistic structure, we still know very 
little about the mechanism underlying relational category learning. My motivation in the 
current experiments was to improve our understanding of relational category learning by 
conducting further tests of the intersection discovery hypothesis and by examining other 
factors (such as the presence of a dual task during learning) that may affect relational 
concept acquisition. 
 The experiments described in Chapter 2 explored factors that might plausibly 
make probabilistic relational categories learnable and provided another test of the schema 
induction hypothesis. The experiments described in Chapter 3 relation-based categories 
by contrasting feature- and relation-based category learning using a dual-task paradigm. 










CHAPTER 2:  
EXPERIMENT 1—TESTING THE INTERMEDIATE ENCODING 
HYPOTHESIS 
In both the Kittur et al. and Jung and Hummel studies, about half the participants 
in the categorize conditions never learned to criterion. But this result implies that about 
half eventually did learn to criterion (albeit much more slowly than the participants in the 
“who’s winning?” condition). On the strictest interpretation of the intersection discovery 
hypothesis, this ought to be impossible (i.e., the intersection is always the empty set, so 
the categories should never be learnable by anyone). This result raises the question: How 
do those participants who learn the categories manage to do so? My motivation in the 
first experiment was to test the hypothesis that those participants who do eventually learn 
to criterion manage to do so by learning subordinate-level sub-categories (within which 
one or two relations do remain invariant), and then learning to classify those sub-
categories with a common label (as elaborated shortly).  
As noted previously, according to the intersection discovery hypothesis, the 
reason probabilistic relational categories are difficult to learn is that intersection 
discovery is invoked with relational concepts (as opposed to simple associative learning, 
which is invoked by featural concepts). The intersection discovery process leads to a 
more general representation of a set of exemplars (e.g., a schema) by deemphasizing (or 
removing entirely) features or relations that are unique to one exemplar or another (Gick 
& Holyoak, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Kittur et al, 2004, 2006b).  
Intersection discovery is useful because it acts to reveal relational generalities 
that might otherwise remain implicit in the mental representation of the individual 
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exemplars (Doumas et al., 2008). However, it fails catastrophically with probabilistic 
categories, in which the intersection is the empty set. In the first experiment, I tested 
whether the comparison process underlying intersection discovery (i.e., structural 
alignment, aka, analogical mapping; see Gick & Holyoak, 1983) can be manipulated to 
enhance discovering an invariant relation so that the empty set problem can be avoided.  
The empty set problem emerges with probabilistic categories when every 
exemplar of a category is compared (directly or indirectly) with every other exemplar. In 
the first experiment, I manipulated stimulus presentation so that each exemplar has a 
specific counterpart for comparison. For example, exemplar [0, 1, 1, 1] was always paired 
with exemplar [1, 0, 1, 1] and exemplar [1, 1, 0, 1] was always paired with exemplar [1, 1, 
1, 0]. Such consistent pairings would give participants the opportunity to learn at least 
two invariant relations between each pair of exemplars. For example, comparing [0, 1, 1, 
1] with [1, 0, 1, 1] leaves the third and fourth relations invariant. Accordingly, I 
hypothesized that the process of selective comparison should prevent the empty set 
problem by encouraging participants to learn subcategories of the nominal categories.  
An additional purpose of the current experiment was to replicate the basic 
difficulty-of-probabilistic-relational-category learning effect with new stimulus materials. 
Kittur et al. (2004, 2006b) used stimuli composed of octagons and squares, and Jung and 
Hummel (2009a, b) used stimuli composed of circles and squares. The current 
experiment used fictional “bugs” as stimuli (Figure 1). The prototype of the category 
“Fea” [1, 1, 1, 1] had a head wider and darker than its body (relations r1 and r2; the first 
two 1’s in the vector), antennae longer than its head (r3) and wings longer than its body 
(r4). The prototypical Dav [0, 0, 0, 0] had the opposite relations, with its body wider and 
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darker than its head (r1 and r2), antennae shorter than its head (r3) and wings shorter 
than its body (r4).  
In the probabilistic condition, any exemplar of A or B shared three relations with 
its own prototype and one with the prototype of the opposite category. In other words, the 
formal probabilistic category structures used were isomorphic with those used by Kittur 
et al (2004, 2006b) and Jung and Hummel (2009a, b).  
      Participants were assigned to one of three learning conditions: The 
subordinate-level condition, the intermediate encoding condition, and the basic baseline 
condition. In the subordinate-level condition, on each trial participants were presented 
with two stimuli simultaneously. The first task was to classify the two different species at 
the basic-level: Fea or Dav. The second task was to reclassify the same two species at the 
subordinate level: Kei Fea or Cim Fea (Figure 2). For example, paired exemplars [0, 1, 1, 
1] and [1, 0, 1, 1] corresponded to “Kei Fea”, and paired exemplars [1, 1, 0, 1] and [1, 1, 
1, 0] corresponded to “Cim Fea”. In the intermediate encoding condition, participants 
saw the same pairs as those in the subordinate-level condition but did not classify them at 
the subordinate level (Figure 3). In the basis baseline condition, participants saw only 
one exemplar at a time and classified it at the basic level (Figure 4).  
The key to encoding at the subordinate-level is that the comparison is designed 
to help participants to discover the relations shared by the mapped exemplars ([− ,− , 1, 1] 
for Cim Fea and [1, 1, −, −] for Kai Fea, and [−, −, 0, 0] for Sko Dav and [0, 0, −, −] for 
Lif Dav). That is, even though, as a whole, the basic level category Fea has no invariant 
relations, its subcategories, Cim and Kai, do. If participants can learn the subcategories 
(i.e., by virtue of the invariants they contain), then perhaps this learning can help to 
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bootstrap their learning of the basic level (even though no invariants exist at that level). 
The intermediate encoding condition presents participants with exemplars in the same 
pairs as the subordinate-level condition but did not require them to label the exemplars at 
the subordinate level. This condition was included to test the role of mere exposure to 
exemplars that share invariants.  
In the basic baseline condition, each trial presented a single bug on the screen and 
the participant’s task was to classify it at the basic (Fea or Dav) level only. This condition 
served as the closest replication of the category learning conditions used by Kittur et al. 
(2004, 2006b) and Jung and Hummel (2009a, b), in which one single object was provided 
for the categorization task. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 44 participants participated in the study for course credit. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  
Materials. Stimuli were line drawings of fictional bugs. The bugs varied in the size and 
darkness of their heads, the length, width and darkness of their bodies, and the length of 
their antennae. The prototype of category “Fea” was defined as [1, 1, 1, 1], and the 
prototype of “Dav” was defined as [0, 0, 0, 0], where the particular value on each 
dimension (1 or 0) defined the value of a relation. The prototype [1, 1, 1, 1] represented 
head larger than body, head darker than body, antennae longer than head, and wings 
longer than body, and [0, 0, 0, 0] represented head shorter than body, head lighter than 
body, antennae shorter than head, and wings shorter than body. Each category (species) 
consisted of one prototype (basic level species) and four exemplars. Subspecies of each 
species were made by grouping pairs of exemplars according to shared relations: Kei Fea 
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= [0, 1, 1, 1] and [1, 0, 1, 1,], and Cim Fea = [1, 1, 0, 1] and [1, 1, 1, 0]; Sko Dav = [1, 0, 
0, 0] and [0, 1, 0, 0], and Lif Dav = [0, 0, 1, 0], and [0, 0, 0, 1]. 8 trials per block were 
presented in the subordinate-level and intermediate encoding conditions, and 16 trials per 
block were presented in the basic baseline condition. Each exemplar was presented in a 
random order once per block.   
Design. The experiment used a 3 condition (subordinate-level vs. intermediate encoding 
vs. basic baseline) between-subjects design.          
Procedure. All conditions consisted of two or more blocks of training trials followed by 
two blocks of transfer trials. The training phase of the experiment differed across 
conditions, as described above. During this phase of the experiment, participants received 
accuracy feedback on each response made on each trial.  
            In the subordinate-level condition, each trial of the training phase simultaneously 
presented two exemplars. Participants identified two bug stimuli at the basic level by 
clicking on boxes under the two bugs. The response was followed by accuracy feedback. 
And then they re-identified the same species at the subordinate level. In the intermediate 
encoding condition, participants were given only the basic-level identification task. In the 
control condition, bugs were presented one at a time in the center of the screen, asking 
participants to identify one bug at the basic level.  
The transfer phase was the same across all conditions. All participants classified 
the bugs at the basic level only and they received no accuracy feedback. 16 trials were 
presented per block, with each exemplar presented in a random order once per block. 
Each exemplar remained on the screen until the participant responded. The training phase 
lasted for 40 blocks (320 trials for subordinate-level and intermediate encoding, and 640 
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trials for basic baseline) or until the participant responded correctly on at least fourteen of 
sixteen trials (87.5% correct) for two consecutive blocks across all conditions. At the end 
of the experiment participants were queried about strategies they used during the 
experiment. 
Predictions 
Consider the possible effects the comparison process may have on category 
learning at basic and subordinate levels. Labeling the exemplars at the subordinate level 
may lead participants to appreciate that, although there is no invariant at the basic level, 
exemplars at the same subordinate level do share invariants. As such, if these invariants 
can guide learning at the subordinate level, then perhaps participants’ mastery of the 
subordinate level categories can help to bootstrap their discovery of the basic level 
categories. To the extent that simple comparison of systematic pairs of exemplars—as 
participants will do in both the subordinate level and intermediate encoding conditions—
is sufficient for invariant discovery, then participants in both these conditions ought to 
learn faster and/or to a higher criterion than those in the basis baseline condition.  
Results 
Study phase: Accuracy. First, I report accuracy on the basic-level (Fea vs. Dav) in each 
condition. A 3 (subordinate-level vs. intermediate encoding vs. basic baseline) between-
subjects ANOVA revealed main effects of task [F (2, 41) = 5.103, MSE = 0.007, p < 
0.05] (Figure 5). As expected, subordinate-level learners (M = .70, SD = .10) were likely 
to perform more accurately than basic baseline learners [Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05)]. 
Intermediate encoding learners (M = .71, SD = .07) were also likely to perform more 
accurately than basic baseline learners (M = .62, SD = .08) [Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05)]. 
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Performance in the subordinate-level condition was almost identical to the performance 
in the intermediate encoding condition. (Tukey’s HSD, p = 0.99). Performance at the 
subordinate-level task (Kei Fea vs. Cim Fea) is reported only in the subordinate-level 
condition (M = .62, SD = .11). Performance at the subordinate-level task was exactly 
identical to in the basic baseline condition (t(27) = -0.089, p = 0.93), implying that 
identifying at the subordinate-level was not as helpful as identifying in the control 
condition.  
Study phase: Trials to criterion.  I also report the rate at which participants learned the 
categories in terms of trials to criterion. All participants in the subordinate-level and 
intermediate encoding conditions reached criterion, whereas only 50% of participants in 
the basic baseline condition reached criterion. A 3 (subordinate-level vs. intermediate 
encoding vs. basic baseline) between-subjects design ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
task [F (2, 41) = 78.511, MSE = 12482.691, p < 0.001]. Participants in the subordinate-
level condition (M = 102, SD = 64) took reliably fewer trials to reach criterion than those 
in the basic baseline condition (by Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). Participants also reached 
criterion in fewer trials in intermediate encoding condition (M = 82, SD = 52) than in the 
basic baseline condition (M = 537, SD = 173) (by Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001) (Figure 6).  
Transfer phase: Accuracy. My primary interest was accuracy on the transfer phase. A 3 
(subordinate-level vs. intermediate encoding vs. basic baseline) between-subjects 
ANOVA revealed main effects of task [F (2, 41) = 9.298, MSE = 0.008, p < 0.001] 
(Figure 7). Participants in the intermediate encoding condition (M = .79, SD = .06) 
showed reliably more accurate performance than participants in the subordinate-level 
condition (M = 0.71, SD = 0.13) [Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05)] as well as in the basic 
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baseline condition (M = 0.65, SD = 0.09) [Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001)]. There was no 
reliable difference between subordinate-level and basic baseline (Tukey’s HSD, p = 
0.32).                             
I also analyzed differences between study and transfer phase to examine how 
much learners improved in each condition (Figure 8). For learners in the subordinate-
level condition, performance on the transfer trials (M = .71, SD = .13) was not reliably 
different from performance on the basic-level study trials (M = .70, SD = .10) [t(13) = 
0.194, p = 0.85), whereas performance at the subordinate-level (M = .62, SD = .11) was 
reliably different from performance on transfer [t(13) = 2.396, p < 0.05], suggesting that 
accuracy at the subordinate-level reliably decreased than accuracy at the basic-level 
(t(13) = -2.912, p < 0.05). For learners in the intermediate encoding condition, 
performance on the transfer trials (M = .79, SD = .06) reliably improved than mean 
performance on the study trials (M = .71, SD = .07) [t(14) = 4.91, p < 0.001). For learners 
in basic baseline, there was no reliable difference between the study (M = .62, SD = .08) 
and transfer trials (M = 0.65, SD = 0.09) [t(14) = 1.93, p = 0.074). Because only 50% of 
participants in basic baseline reached criterion, which means the rest of the participants 
were given the transfer trials under the circumstance they did not figure out the category 
learning rule, it seems that there was no reliable difference between the study and transfer 
trials.             
                                                Discussion 
Previous research reported that participants have great difficulty learning 
relational categories with probabilistic structures (Kittur et al., 2004, 2006b, Jung & 
Hummel, 2009a, b, 2011). The difficulty was interpreted in terms of participants’ 
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attempting to learn relational structures through a process of intersection discovery, 
which retains those features and relations exemplars have in common and discards those 
on which the exemplars differ (Doumas et al., 2008; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003). Such an 
approach to learning relational categories will work as long as there are one or more 
features or relations shared by category members. Experiment 1 examined under what 
condition the relations shared by category members can be retained. I took as a starting 
point the way in which an exemplar is compared with other exemplar. I hypothesized that 
if an exemplar of relational concepts has a counterpart to compare, one or two relations 
can remain invariant.  
The results of Experiment 1 showed that simple comparison of systematic pairs of 
exemplars was enough to improve participants’ ability to learn probabilistic relational 
categories. For participants in the intermediate encoding condition, the comparison task 
at the basic level helped them to abstract shared relations between the exemplars (11− − 
and − −11 for Fea, 00 − − and − − 00 for Dav).  
Performance in the subordinate-level condition was reliably less accurate than in 
the intermediate encoding condition, and there was no difference between the 
subordinate-level condition and basic baseline condition. The basic level performance in 
the subordinate-level condition was almost identical to the intermediate encoding 
condition, but there was a reliable difference between two conditions during transfer, 
suggesting that the subordinate classification task would hurt category learning in some 
way. A post-hoc analysis of participants’ end-of-experiment self-reports revealed that 
participants’ decisions were partially based on the commonality defined in terms of 
numerical values such as head width, wing length, etc., rather than relative values (such 
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as head wider than body). Participants seemed to speculate that the exemplars with the 
same numerical size, darkness, or length belong to the same subspecies. In making the 
stimuli, exemplars of each category were constructed by varying the metric properties 
size, darkness and length, respecting the categorical relations larger, darker, and longer. 
On this account randomly generated values for each exemplar might have been the same 
from time to time. For example, when heads with larger and darker relations across the 
exemplars define the Fea species, two exemplars may have the same head size (or head 
darkness) across the exemplars. That is, it seems that the query of the subspecies led 
participants to focus more on featural aspects, resulting in the impaired learning. Such 
tendency toward paying more attention to featural properties may have continued to 
influence transfer.  
Clearly important for my current purpose was the fact that, as predicted, 
comparing the exemplars in a systematic way improved the participants’ ability to 
discover invariants so that the empty set could be rendered as non-empty. However, it 
still remains unclear how the task at the subordinate-level would hurt performance during 
transfer. Perhaps the order of encoding—basic-level encoding was followed by 
subordinate-level encoding—could be a potential reason for learning decline in 








CHAPTER 3: PILOT STUDY 
Experiment 1a showed that subordinate-level encoding was no more effective 
during training, and less effective during transfer, than intermediate encoding. One 
possible explanation for this finding, which is broadly consistent with the logic of 
Experiment 1a, is that in that in the subordinate-level encoding condition of experiment, I 
had participants perform the basic-level classification before they performed the 
subordinate-level classification. But if subordinate-level classification is to serve as an 
aid to basic-level classification, then it is reasonable to expect that it ought to temporally 
precede that basic-level classification. Experiment 1b was designed to test this 
hypothesis: For example, suppose that participants learned Kei Fea is defined by the 
invariant (− −11), and Cim Fea is defined by the invariant (11− −). When participants 
judge a higher-level species, Fea or Dav, they could associate the invariant (− −11) with 
Fea or also the other invariant (11− −) with Fea. Such simple association would be able to 
make participants to learn probabilistic relational categories in a more simple way than 
the way the basic task is followed by the subordinate task.  
 The procedure of the pilot study was exactly identical to Experiment 1 except that 
participants were first given the subordinate-level classification task, and then the basic-
level classification task.  
Method 
Participants. 12 participants participated in the study for course credit. 
Materials and procedure. The same bug stimuli as Experiment 1 were used. In the pilot 
study, the subordinate labels did not include the basic names (i.e., Kei and Cim), unless 
36 
 
they would already tell the answer for the following basic level task (Figure 9). The 
procedure for the pilot study was opposite to the Experiment 1a. The subordinate-task 
was followed by the basic-task. 
Results 
The pilot study tested only the subordinate-level condition to roughly measure 
how much performance could improve when the task’s order was flipped. I compared 
performance in the pilot study with performance in the subordinate-level condition of 
Experiment 1a. 
Study phase: Accuracy. Performance at the subordinate-level (Kei vs. Cim) in the pilot 
study (M = .65, SD = .09) was not reliably different from the subordinate-level in 
Experiment 1a (M = .62, SD = .11) [t(24) = -0.832, p = 0.413]. There was reliable 
difference between the basic-level tasks in two experiments. Accuracy in the pilot study 
(M = .77, SD = .04) was reliably different from accuracy in Experiment 1a (M = .70, SD 
= .10) [t(24) = -2.134, p < 0.05] (Figure 10).                    
Trials to criterion. As in Experiment 1a, all participants in the pilot study reached 
criterion, and there was no difference between trials-to-criterion in the pilot study (M = 
94, SD = 78) and Experiment 1a (M = 102, SD = 64) [t(24) = 0.307, p = 0.761].   
Transfer phase: Accuracy. Transfer performance in the pilot study (M = .79, SD = .05) 
was marginally different from performance in Experiment 1a (M = .71, SD = .13) [t(24) = 
-1.935, p = 0.065). In the pilot study, performance on the transfer trials (M = .79, SD 
= .05) was not reliably different from performance on the basic-level study trials (M = .77, 
SD = .04) [t(11) = -0.116, p = 0.29), whereas performance at the subordinate-level study 
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trials (M = .62, SD = .11) was reliably different from performance on transfer [t(11) = -
6.375, p < 0.001]. 
Discussion 
The pilot study was designed to examine why the subordinate-level condition of 
Experiment 1a was less helpful than expected. I speculated that as the aid to basic-level 
classification, subordinate level classification should have preceded basic-level 
classification. In the pilot study, the task order was flipped: The basic task followed the 
subordinate task. When compared to the subordinate-level results in Experiment 1a, fairly 
reliable improvement was observed in the pilot study. The effects seem to benefit from 
associative learning: Associating each subordinate having two invariants with the basic. 
The process of associating is schematized in Figure 11. Relational learning, with 
invariants available, drives the subordinate task; then associative learning is all that is 
required to learn which subordinate-level categories belong together as members of the 










EXPERIMENT 2—TESTING THE PROTOTYPE COMPARISON 
HYPOTHESIS 
In the next experiment, I tested two key manipulations to find another way to 
learn probabilistic relational categories. First, as a more direct way to circumvent the 
empty set problem, participants were trained to compare each exemplar with a prototype. 
My hypothesis was that comparing the exemplars to the prototype can help participants 
learn to categorize the bug stimuli in terms of prototype-plus-exception rules. For 
example, mapping the prototype [1, 1, 1, 1] to the exemplar [1, 0, 1, 1] will result in a 
schema that includes r1, r2 and r4, but lacks r2 (i.e., [1, −, 1, 1]). Whichever exemplar is 
compared to the prototype, the resulting schema will always produce one of the 
probabilistic category structures, minus the mismatching relation (i.e., [−, 1, 1, 1], [1, −, 1, 
1], [1, 1, −, 1] or [1, 1, 1, −]). The prototype-plus-exception rules could potentially reveal 
three invariant relations per exemplar (although the invariants will not be constant across 
exemplars within a category).  
Participants in the prototype condition were provided a prototypical member of 
each species and were asked to classify it using a basic-level label (e.g., “Fea” or “Dav”) 
and then they reclassified the exemplar species using a subordinate-level label: Kei Fea, 
Bai Fea, Wou Fea, or Cim Fea. I hypothesized that the basic label and a set of 
subordinate labels might provide participants with an explicit hierarchical structure could 
facilitate learning the category structure. If so, then each subordinate label would be 
associated with the relational difference between that exemplar and the prototype of its 
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category (the exceptional relation): Kei Fea (smaller head), Bai Fea (lighter head), Wou 
Fea (shorter antenna), and Cim Fea (shorter wing).  
Following on the intermediate encoding condition of Experiment 1, which 
allowed participants to compare systematic pairs of category exemplars, this experiment 
also tested whether random pairing of exemplars might also facilitate learning of 
relational invariants. Randomly pairing exemplars would highlight two invariants on each 
trial, although across trials, the invariants so highlighted would be free to vary. The 
random pairing manipulation was tested in the two different exemplars condition. After 
identifying the exemplars at the basic-level, participants were asked to re-identify each 
exemplar at the subordinate-level.  
The two same exemplars condition was designed to test the Experiment 1’s results, 
in which participants’ decision was partially influenced by the same metric properties 
(e.g., the same wing length) between the exemplars. I examined when the exemplars have 
the exactly identical relations, but also have different metric properties, whether different 
featural properties would affect category learning. For exemplar, the exemplars (e.g., 
1101, head size 4 and 1101, head size 7) would be exactly identical in terms of the 
relational property, or would be different in terms of the featural property.  
Two kinds of control condition were used: Subordinate baseline and basic 
baseline. In the subordinate baseline condition, one single bug was presented, followed 
by the basic-level and subordinate-level classification tasks. Participants in the basic 
baseline condition were given only the basic-level classification task.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 96 participants participated in the study for course credit. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions.  
Materials.  The same bug stimuli were used in this experiment as in Experiment 1. 
Unlike the previous experiment, in which two different exemplars were associated with 
one label, the prototype from each category and all exemplars were associated with all 
different labels in Experiment 2: For the Fea species [1, 1, 1, 1] was the prototype, Kei 
Fea = [0, 1, 1, 1], Bai Fea = [1, 0, 1, 1,], Wou Fea = [1, 1, 0, 1], and Cim Fea = [1, 1, 1, 0] 
served as the subordinates; For the Dav species [0, 0, 0, 0] was the prototype, Haw Dav = 
[1, 0, 0, 0], Ang Dav = [0, 1, 0, 0], Sko Dav = [0, 0, 1, 0], and Lif Dav = [0, 0, 0, 1] were 
the subordinates.   
Design. The experiment used a 5-condition (prototype vs. two different exemplars vs. two 
same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic baseline) between-subjects design.          
Procedure. All conditions except basic baseline were provided two or more blocks of 
training trials consisting of basic and subordinate classification tasks (only the basic task 
was provided in basic baseline), followed by two blocks of transfer trials, as in the 
previous experiment. The training phase of the experiment differed across conditions, as 
described below. During this phase, participants received accuracy feedback on each trial. 
The transfer phase was the same across all conditions. Participants classified the bugs at 
the basic level only and they received no accuracy feedback.  
Participants were assigned to one of five training conditions: prototype, two 
different exemplars, two same exemplars, subordinate baseline, and basic baseline. In the 
prototype condition, participants were shown one bug that belongs to the prototype on the 
left side on the screen. They first decided whether the prototypical bug belongs to Fea or 
Dav by clicking the name and then a new exemplar appeared in the right side (the 
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prototypical species remained on the screen). They decided the corresponding exemplar’s 
name as the second task (Figure 12).  
In the two different exemplars condition, two different exemplars belonging to the 
same species, randomly chosen, were provided simultaneously. Participants first decided 
the basic level category to which two exemplars belong and then decided each 
exemplar’s name by clicking the mouse. For example, when two exemplars [1, 1, 0, 1] 
and [1, 0, 1, 1] are matched, participants should classify them as the Fea species at the 
basic level and then re-classify the exemplar [1, 1, 0, 1] as Wou Fea, and [1, 0, 1, 1] as 
Bai Fea at the subordinate-level (Figure 13).  
The two same exemplars condition was identical to the two different exemplars 
condition, except that two exemplars were defined by exactly the same relations, but 
differing in their metric properties. For example, below two bugs have the exactly same 
relations: Head larger than body, and head lighter than body, antennae longer than head, 
and wings longer than body. The only difference between two bugs is the metric darkness 
of the head (Figure 14).  
In the subordinate baseline condition, the participant classified one bug per trial at both 
the basic and subordinate levels. In the basic baseline condition participants classified 
each bug at the basic level only (Figure 15).                   
During training, in prototype, two different exemplars, and two same exemplars, 8 
trials were presented per block, in subordinate baseline, and basic baseline, 16 trials were 
presented per block. In all conditions, the transfer phase was identical to the learning 
phase of the basic baseline condition. 16 trials were presented per block, with each 
exemplar presented in a random order once per block. Each exemplar remained on the 
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screen until the participant responded. The training phase lasted for 40 blocks (320 trials 
for prototype, two different exemplars, and two same exemplars, and 640 trials for 
subordinate baseline, and basic baseline) or until the participant responded correctly on 
at least fourteen of sixteen trials (87.5% correct) for two consecutive blocks. At the end 
of the experiment participants were queried about strategies they use during the 
experiment. 
Predictions 
 My main interest was in accuracy on the transfer phase. I predicted that the 
prototype condition will show better performance than the other conditions. I assumed 
that comparing the prototype with the exemplar can tell participants which relations are 
identical to each other and which relation is different between two bugs. In any case, 
three shared relations might be learned per exemplar.   
 I also predicted that participants who will be shown simultaneously two 
exemplars in the training phase (i.e., two different exemplars and two same exemplars) 
would face more difficult challenges compared to the prototype condition. In two 
different exemplars, randomly pairing exemplars would highlight two invariants on each 
trial. If the participants can appreciate two invariants, then their performance would be as 
helpful as intermediate encoding of Experiment 1, but less than the prototype condition. 
In two same exemplars, exactly the same exemplars (in terms of relations) will be 
provided, which means this condition may equal the control condition where a single bug 
will be presented, as long as the participants will focus more on relational properties than 
featural ones.  
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The subordinate-baseline and basic-baseline conditions will serve as control 
conditions that do not explicitly involve comparison. 
Results 
Study phase: Accuracy on basic-level. A 5 (prototype vs. two different exemplars vs. 
two same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic baseline) between-subjects 
ANOVA revealed main effects of task [F (4, 91) = 45.518, MSE = 0.008, p < 0.001] 
(Figure 16). Participants in the prototype condition performed more accurately than those 
in all other conditions. Prototype learners (M = 0.92, SD = 0.06) were likely to perform 
more accurately than two different exemplars learners (M = 0.66, SD = 0.11) [Tukey’s 
HSD, p < 0.001)], two same exemplars learners (M = 0.63, SD = 0.09) [Tukey’s HSD, p 
< 0.001)], subordinate baseline learners (M = 0.60, SD = 0.08) [Tukey’s HSD, p < 
0.001)], and basic baseline learners (M = 0.64, SD = 0.08) [Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001)]. 
There were no other reliable differences between the conditions at the basic level during 
the study phase.          
Study phase: Accuracy on subordinate-level. A 4 (prototype vs. two different 
exemplars vs. two same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline) between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of task [F (3, 73) = 5.889, MSE = 0.015, p < 0.01] (Figure 17). 
Participants in the prototype condition showed more accurate performance than 
participants in all other conditions. Prototype learners (M = 0.46, SD = 0.16) were likely 
to perform more accurately than two different exemplars learners (M = 0.35, SD = 0.12) 
[Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05)], two same exemplars learners (M = 0.31, SD = 0.48) [Tukey’s 
HSD, p < 0.01)], and subordinate baseline learners (M = 0.33, SD = 0.13) [Tukey’s HSD, 
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p < 0.01)]. There were no other reliable differences between the conditions at the 
subordinate level during the study phase.                                        
Study phase: Basic-level vs. subordinate-level. I report the difference between the 
basic-level and subordinate-level in each condition except for basic baseline to examine 
how much learning at different category levels were different. For the participants in 
prototype condition, performance at the basic-level (M = 0.92, SD = 0.07) was reliably 
different from one at the subordinate-level (M = 0.46, SD = 0.16) [t(19) = 13.176, p < 
0.001]. Basic-level (M = 0.66, SD = 0.11) in two different exemplars was reliably 
different from subordinate-level (M = 0.35, SD = 0.12) [t(19) = 11.357, p < 0.001] 
Performance at basic-level (M = 0.63, SD = 0.09) in two same exemplars was reliably 
different from subordinate-level (M = 0.31, SD = 0.05) [t(17) = 13.880, p < 0. 001]. 
Basic-level (M = 0.60, SD = 0.09) in subordinate baseline was reliably different from 
subordinate-level (M = 0.33, SD = 0.13) [t(18) = 10.704, p < 0.001] (Figure 17).             
Study phase: Trials to criterion. I also report how many trials participants needed to 
reach to criterion during the study phase in terms of the basic-level. Only in the prototype 
condition did all participants reach criterion. A 5 (prototype vs. two different exemplars 
vs. two same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic baseline) between-subjects 
design ANOVA revealed a main effect of task [F (4, 91) = 107.139, MSE = 8776.459, p 
< 0.001] (Figure 18).  
As expected, participants reached criterion in fewer trials in prototype (M = 36, 
SD = 27) than in two different exemplars (M = 239, SD = 89) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001), 
in two same exemplars (M = 285, SD = 69) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001), in subordinate 
baseline (M = 592, SD = 113) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001), and in basic baseline (M = 496, 
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SD = 133) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). Participants given the two different exemplars task 
(M = 239, SD = 89) took reliably fewer trials to reach criterion than those in the 
subordinate baseline (M = 592, SD = 113) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001) and also those in 
the basic baseline task (M = 496, SD = 133) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). Participants 
given the two same exemplars task (M = 285, SD = 69) also took reliably fewer trials to 
reach criterion than those in the subordinate baseline (M = 592, SD = 113) (Tukey’s HSD, 
p < 0.001) and also those in the basic baseline task (M = 496, SD = 133) (Tukey’s HSD, 
p < 0.001). Participants given the basic baseline task (M = 592, SD = 113) took reliably 
fewer trials to reach criterion than those in the subordinate baseline (M = 496, SD = 133) 
(Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05).  
Transfer phase: Accuracy. My primary interest was accuracy on transfer phase. A 5 
(prototype vs. two different exemplars vs. two same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline 
vs. basic baseline) between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of task [F (4, 91) = 
5.943, MSE = 0.011, p < 0.001] (Figure 19). Participants in prototype (M = .80, SD = .07) 
showed reliably more accurate performance than in two different exemplars (M = 0.69, 
SD = 0.10) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.01), in two same exemplars (M = .68, SD = .11) 
(Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.01), in subordinate baseline (M = .65, SD = .16) [Tukey’s HSD, p < 
0.01)] and in basic baseline (M = .68, SD = .07) (Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.01).  
As in Experiment 1a, I report differences between study (only basic-level) and 
transfer to examine how much participants learned in each condition (Figure 20). 
Surprisingly, for learners in prototype, performance decreased on transfer (M = .92, SD 
= .07) relative to study (M = .80, SD = .07) [t(19) = 4.920, p < 0.001]. For learners in two 
different exemplars, performance on transfer (M = .69, SD = .10) slightly increased from 
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study to transfer (M = .66, SD = .11) [t(19) = 1.498, p = 0.151). For learners in two same 
exemplars, the difference between study (M = .63, SD = .09) and transfer (M = .68, SD 
= .11) was marginally reliable [t(17) = 1.865, p = 0.079). For learners in subordinate 
baseline, performance on transfer (M = .65, SD = .16) slightly increased relative to study 
(M = .60, SD = .08) [t(18) = 1.745, p = 0.098). For learners in basic baseline, the 
difference between study (M = .64, SD = .08) and transfer (M = .68, SD = .07) was not 
reliable [t(18) = 1.637, p = 0.119). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 examined whether providing participants prototypes of the basic-
level categories would facilitate their learning of the exemplars of those categories by 
helping them to learn the exemplars in a rule-plus-exception fashion. As expected, 
performance in the prototype condition exceeded performance in the other conditions. 
Prototype learners showed above 90 % correct in classifying the prototype, and 80% 
correct during transfer. Providing the prototypes appears to have helped participants to 
learn the exemplars. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that explicitly 
providing the prototype can help learners overcome the difficulties posed by the empty 
intersection problem.  
Learning in a random pairing fashion did not help learners overcome the 
difficulties posed by the empty intersection problem: Neither the difference between two 
different exemplars and two same exemplars, nor even the difference between 
comparison conditions and single conditions was reliable. In contrast to Experiment 1 
where the same pair was consistently compared, random parings seemed to fail to drive 
the discovery of invariants. According to a post-hoc analysis of self-reports, majority of 
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participants mentioned that they were able to discover the relational similarities between 
the exemplars to some extent, but they little understood how to define each species. In 
conclusion, comparing random pairs was not as helpful as comparing specific pairs, and 






















CHAPTER 5:  
EXPERIMENT 3—TESTING THE EFFECTS OF DUAL VERBAL 
AND VISUAL DUAL TASKS ON FEATURAL VS. RELATIONAL 
CATEGORY LEARNING 
  The results from Experiment 1 and 2 added further evidence that the learning 
mechanism for relational categories with a probabilistic structure is the intersection 
discovery hypothesis, which is quite a contrast to associative learning for featural 
learning mechanism. Such evidence accordingly implies that relational and featural 
categories are learned in qualitatively different ways.   
In Experiment 3, I investigated the sensitivity of feature- and relation-based 
category leaning to two different kinds of dual-task disruption. In contrast to feature-
based representations, which come to us effortlessly, relational representations require 
attention and working memory (see, e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997, 2003; Logan, 1994; Maybery, Bain, & Halford, 1986). 
To the extent that featural and relational category learning rely on different kinds 
of mental representations, they might be differentially disrupted by different kinds of dual 
tasks. In particular, it is reasonable to hypothesize that featural learning may be more 
disrupted by a dual task that consumes visual working memory resources than by one that 
consumes verbal or executive resources (inasmuch as featural category learning is largely 
a visual learning task), whereas relational category learning may be more disrupted by a 
dual task that consumes verbal or executive working memory (inasmuch as relational 
processing is an explicit, attention-demanding task).  
Other researchers have also argued for multiple systems of category learning 
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(Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998). Miles and Minda (2011) showed that 
verbal dual tasks, which impose an executive functioning load, impaired rule-defined 
category learning, whereas a visual dual task impaired non-rule-defined learning 
regardless of executive functioning demand. Their findings provided evidence that verbal 
working memory and executive functioning are engaged in the rule-defined system, and 
visual processing is more engaged in the non-rule-defined system. 
My next experiment tested the prediction that relational category learning will be 
more subject to verbal dual-task interference than feature-based category learning. By 
contrast, feature-based learning will be more subject to visuospatial dual-task 
interference than relational learning.  
I used deterministic category structures in the current experiment; i.e., there was 
always be one relation or feature that is deterministically predictive of category 
membership. The reason for using deterministic categories is that the categories must be 
learnable, even in the relational case, so that I can observe the effects of the manipulation 
on trials to criterion (i.e., how long it takes participants to learn the categories).  
I orthogonally crossed relational- vs. feature-based categories with verbal dual 
task vs. visual dual task vs. no dual task. In the verbal dual task conditions, participants 
had to perform a task known to interfere with relational processing (memorizing digits) 
while they simultaneously performed the category learning task. In the visual dual task 
condition, participants had to memorize the locations of filled squares in 3 X 3 grids 
while simultaneously learning the categorization. In the no dual task condition, 






Participants. A total of 75 participants participated in the study for course credit. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. 
Materials. Each exemplar consisted of a grey ellipse and a grey rectangle. Each 
exemplar had both relational properties (e.g., ellipse bigger than rectangle) and featural 
properties (e.g., ellipse of size 4). Each participant was tasked with deciding whether the 
objects they saw belonged to one of two featural or one of two relational categories.  
Each exemplar was defined by three category-relevant properties: size (absolute 
in the featural condition or relative in the relational condition), darkness (absolute or 
relative) and orientation (absolute or relative). In the featural condition, the orientation of 
the ellipse was deterministically associated with category membership (i.e., horizontal 
orientation for category A, vertical for category L), whereas in the relational category 
condition, the relative orientation of the ellipse and rectangle (i.e., either same or 
different) was deterministically associated with category membership (with same for 
category A and different for category L). The other properties were probabilistically 
associated with category membership. 
For the featural category condition, the prototypes of the categories were defined 
as [1,1,1] for category A and [0,0,0] for L, where [1,1,1] represents an rectangle size 3 
[out of 9] for category A, 7 for category L, the color 3 [out of 9] for category A, 7 for 
category L, and horizontal orientation for category A, vertical for category L (Figure 21). 
Similarly, for the relational category condition, the prototypes were defined as [1,1,1] for 
category A and [0,0,0] for L, where [1,1,1] represents an ellipse larger, darker, and same 
orientation and [0,0,0] represents a rectangle larger, darker, and different orientation 
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(Figure 22). Exemplars of each category were made by switching the value of one 
dimension in the prototype (e.g., relational category A exemplar [1,0,1] would have the 
ellipse larger, lighter, and same orientation as the rectangle). Four copies of each 
exemplar type were presented on each block, two paired with a “Yes” responses on the 
dual task and two with a “No” responses, resulting in 32 trials per category per block. 
Design. The experiment used a 3 (dual task: none vs. verbal vs. visuospatial) X 2 
(relevant property: features vs. relations) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the six groups. For the dual 
task conditions, on each trial, a memory task was provided first and followed by a 
categorization task and by a recall task. In the control conditions, only the categorization 
task was provided. Both categorization and dual task responses were followed by 
accuracy feedback (Figure 23).  
Participants in the verbal dual-task condition were first given a verbal working 
memory task, in which 5 random digits were displayed for two seconds with spaces 
between them (so that they appeared to be individual numbers rather than digits of a 
single number). Participants were asked to memorize the digits while they performed the 
categorization task. In the categorization task, an exemplar consisting of a rectangle and 
an ellipse was shown. Participants were instructed to press the A key if the stimulus 
belong to category A and the D key if it belong to D. Each exemplar remained on the 
screen until the participant responded. Responses were followed by accuracy feedback. 
Participants then saw one random digit and were asked to decide whether it was in the set 
they saw previously.  
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In the visuospatial dual-task condition, a 3 by 3 grid was displayed in the middle 
of a screen for two seconds with two randomly-chosen cells filled. Participants were 
asked to memorize the locations of the filled cells until they completed the categorization 
task. In the recall task, one filled cell was displayed in the grid and participants were 
asked whether the cell had been filled in the original display. The experiment was consist 
of 30 blocks (960 trials) and continue until the participant responded correctly on at least 
twenty nine of thirty two trials (90.6% correct) for two consecutive blocks or until all 30 
blocks transpired, whichever comes first. At the end of the experiment participants were 
queried about strategies they use during the experiment. 
Predictions 
I hypothesize that the two dual tasks will interact with the kinds of category 
learning in different ways. The verbal dual task will interfere with relational category 
learning to a greater extent than featural category learning. In contrast, I hypothesize that 
the visuospatial dual task will interfere with featural category learning to a greater extent 
than relational category learning. Taken together, I predict the additional distinction 
between feature-and relation-based category learning via the double dissociation between 
visual vs. verbal dual task interference on the one hand and featural vs. relational 
category learning on the other. 
Results 
Dual task accuracy. I discarded the data from participants whose accuracy was below 
70% correct on the dual task (2 participants in the verbal/featural condition). Mean 
accuracy on the verbal dual task was M = .94 (SD = .03) for the featural category learning 
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condition, and M = 0.91 (SD = 0.06) for the relational learning condition. Mean accuracy 
on the visual dual task was M  = 0.91 (SD = 0.06) for the featural condition, and M = 0.89 
(SD = 0.04) for the relational condition. There was no reliable difference between the 
verbal and visuospatial tasks [t(51) = 1.61, p = .114], suggesting that these tasks occupied 
cognitive resources to roughly the same extent.  
Category learning task accuracy: Trials to criterion. Since my primary interest is the 
rate at which participants learn the categories as a function of the dual tasks, I report the 
data first in terms of trials to criterion. These analyses are conservative in the sense that 
participants who never learned to criterion were treated as though they reached criterion 
on the last block. Figure 24 shows the mean trials to criterion by category learning 
condition. A 3 (dual task) × 2 (category learning task) between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of dual task [F(2, 69) = 5.058, MSE = 579014.858, p < 0.01]. 
Since my main interest was in how different dual tasks affect the different kinds of 
category learning, one-way ANOVAs were conducted for the featural and relational 
learning conditions. The results revealed reliable differences between dual tasks in the 
featural category learning condition [F(2,35) = 4.981, MSE = 617725.846, p < 0.05]. 
Planned comparisons in the featural category learning showed that there was a reliable 
difference between the verbal (M = 386, SD = 387) and visuospatial dual task (M = 697, 
SD = 411) [t(35) = -2.288, p < 0.05]. There was also a reliable difference between the 
visuospatial and the control condition (M = 262, SD = 191) [t(35) = 3.014, p < 0.01]. The 
difference between the verbal and the control condition was not reliable [t(35) = 0.877, p 
< 0.386]. The ANOVA results from the relational condition revealed reliable differences 
between the dual tasks [F(2,34) = 7.641, MSE = 799483.887, p < 0.01]. Planned 
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comparisons revealed that there was a reliable difference between the verbal (M = 739, 
SD = 352) and visuospatial dual task (M = 330, SD = 362) [t(34) = 3.221, p < 0.01]. 
There was also a reliable difference between the verbal and control conditions (M = 276, 
SD = 222) [t(34) = 3.014, p < 0.01]. The difference between the visuospatial and control 
conditions was not reliable [t(34) = 0.404, p < 0.689]. No other main effects were 
statistically reliable. Most interestingly, there was a reliable interaction between dual task 
and category learning, indicating that relational category learning was disrupted more by 
the verbal dual task, whereas featural category learning was disrupted more by the 
visuospatial dual task [F(2,69) = 2.475, MSE = 855659.946, p < 0.01].  
Response times. Since the category learning accuracy results yielded a reliable 
interaction between the dual and category learning tasks, I also analyzed these tasks in 
terms of participants’ mean response times on individual trials in order to gain insight 
about the strategies participants in each condition may have adopted. A 3 (dual task) × 2 
(category learning task) between-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of dual task 
[F(2, 69) = 3.202, MSE = 0.961, p < 0.05]. One-way ANOVAs were also conducted in 
each category learning condition. The main effect of dual task was not reliable [F(2, 35) 
= 2.137, MSE = 0.612, p = 0.133] in the featual learning condition. But since the 
accuracy data showed that participants in visuospatial feature-learning required many 
more trials than to reach to the criterion than participants in verbal featural learning, I 
expected a reliable difference between two conditions in a planned comparison analysis. 
My prediction was confirmed. There was a reliable difference between the verbal (M = 
0.99, SD = 0.31) and visuospatial dual task (M = 1.41, SD = 0.78) [t(35) = -2.037, p < 
0.05], indicating that response times in visuospatial feature-learning condition were 
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longer than those in verbal feature-learning. No other differences were statistically 
reliable. There were no reliable differences in the relational learning condition. Also, 
ANOVA showed a reliable main effect of category learning [F(1, 69) = 3.883, MSE = 
1.166, p = 0.053], indicating that feature learning (M = 1.17, SD = 0.55) was marginally 
faster than relational learning (M = 1.42, SD = 0.56) (Figure 25). 
Discussion 
To the extent that relational concepts are qualitatively similar to feature-based 
concepts, our understanding of concepts can be expected to generalize from the 
(extensively investigated) case of feature-based categories to the (largely neglected) case 
of relational categories. However, there is reason to believe they are not, casting doubt on 
our ability to generalize our conclusions from studies using feature-based categories to 
the case of relational concepts. 
Most notably, people have no difficulty learning feature-based categories in 
which no single feature remains invariant across all members of a category (see Murphy, 
2002). By contrast, relational categories are extremely difficult to learn when there is no 
such relational invariant (Kittur et al., 2004, 2006b; Jung and Hummel 2009a, 2009b, 
2011). These findings suggest that featural and relational learning rely not only on 
qualitatively different forms of mental representation (namely, features vs. relations; see, 
e.g., Hummel, 2010; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, for a discussion of the difference) but 
also that they rely on qualitatively different kinds of learning algorithms (e.g., associative 
learning in the featural case and something more akin to structured intersection discovery 
in the relational case; Jung & Hummel, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). 
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The current experiment provides additional evidence for this sharp distinction 
between featural and relational category learning. In the current experiment, featural 
learning was impeded by a visual dual task (i.e., one that might be expected to interfere 
with visual feature processing as required for featural learning) but not by a verbal dual 
task. Relational category learning, in sharp contrast, was interfered with by a verbal dual 
task (which has been shown to interfere with relational processing; Waltz, Lau, Grewal, 
&, Holyoak, 2000), but not by a visual dual task. This double dissociation between visual 
vs. verbal dual task interference on the one hand and featural vs. relational category 
learning on the other adds to the growing evidence that these two kinds of category 


















CHAPTER 6:  
EXPERIMENT 4—TESTING THE EFFECTS OF A RELATION-
CENTERED VISUAL DUAL TASK ON CATEGORY LEARNING 
In the previous experiment, I predicted that the visual dual task would interfere 
with the featrual category learning more than the verbal dual task would. In the previous 
study, the visual dual-task was to memorize the locations of two shaded cells in a 3 by 3 
grid, which could be characterized as a feature-centered visual dual-task. The following 
experiment investigated the effects of a more relational visual-dual task on featural and 
relational category learning.  
My question was that to what extent a relation-centered visual dual-task interferes 
with category learning. Previously, I predicted that a visual dual-task would hinder 
feature-based category learning, since the resources—implicit and less attention-
demanding—that are necessary to process featural categories are lately the same as those 
necessary to perform the visual dual task. By contrast, a relation-centered visual dual-task 
whose process can be characterized as more attention-demanding, may be more likely to 
interfere with relational category learning. Thus I will be able to observe the resilience of 
feature-based category learning under a relation-centered visual dual-task.  
I orthogonally crossed relational- vs. feature-based categories with verbal vs. 
visual-relation dual task. The verbal dual task condition was identical to one used in the 
previous experiment. In the relation-centered visual dual task condition, a hexagon and an 
octagon with different sizes were provided simultaneously. Participants had to memorize 





Participants. A total of 61 participants participated in the study for course credit. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
Materials. The same ellipse and rectangle stimuli were used in this experiment as in the 
previous experiments. 
Design. The experiment used a 2 (dual task: verbal vs. relation-centered visual) X 2 
(relevant property: features vs. relations) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. In the verbal dual task condition, the same procedure as the previous 
experiment was used. In the relation-centered visual dual-task condition, a hexagon and 
an octagon of different sizes were presented in a random location for two seconds. 
Participants were asked to memorize the relative sizes of the two objects until they 
completed the categorization task. In the recall task, a hexagon and an octagon were 
displayed in random locations of the screen and participants were asked whether the 
relative sizes of two objects were the same as ones in the original display. The 
experiment lasted for 30 blocks (960 trials) or until the participant responded correctly on 
at least twenty nine of thirty two trials (90.6% correct) for two consecutive blocks. At the 
end of the experiment participants were queried about strategies they used during the 
experiment. 
Predictions 
I predict that the relation-centered visual dual-task will influence category 
learning in the same manner as the verbal dual task. Specifically, the relational visual 
dual task, like the verbal dual task, will impair relational category learning to a greater 
extent than featural category learning. That is, in contrast with the previous experiment 
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where more feature-characterized visual dual-task was used, more relation-characterized 
visual dual-task will interfere with relation-based category learning.  
Results 
Dual task accuracy. I discarded the data from participants whose accuracy was below 
70% correct on the dual task (1 participant in the visual/featural condition, and 2 
participants in the visual/relational condition). Mean accuracy on the verbal dual task was 
M = 0.92 (SD = 0.09) for the featural category learning condition, and M = 0.92 (SD = 
0.05) for the relational learning condition. Mean accuracy on the visual dual task was M 
= 0.86 (SD = 0.07) for the featural condition, and M = 0.84 (SD = 0.06) for the relational 
condition. Accuracy on the visual dual task in Experiment 4 declined to some extent 
compared to the visual dual task in Experiment 3. There was reliable difference between 
the verbal and visual tasks [t(59) = 3.862, p < 0.001], suggesting that the visual dual task 
occupied more cognitive resources than the verbal dual task did. However, my main 
interest in Experiment 4 was that how the relation-centered visual dual-task would 
interact with featural and relational category learning, not how two different dual tasks 
would interact with separate category learning.   
Category learning task accuracy: Trials to criterion. Since my primary interest is the 
rate at which participants learn the categories as a function of the dual tasks, I report the 
data first in terms of trials to criterion. These analyses are conservative in the sense that 
participants who never learned to criterion were treated as though they reached criterion 
on the last block. Figure 26 shows the mean trials to criterion by condition. A 2 (dual 
task) × 2 (category learning task) between-subjects ANOVA revealed that there was no 
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reliable difference between verbal and visual dual tasks [F(1, 57) = 0.442, MSE = 
66109.223,  p = 0.509].                          
Since my main interest is in how different dual tasks affect the different kinds of 
category learning, I compared the accuracy on featural and relational category learning 
within each dual-task. As expected, the results revealed a reliable difference between the 
featural (M = 329, SD = 395) and relational conditions (M = 657, SD = 390) within the 
verbal dual- task [t(28) = -2.292, p < 0.05]. Interestingly, there was also a reliable 
difference between the featural (M = 286, SD = 350) and relational conditions (M = 568, 
SD = 407) within the visual dual-task [t(29) = -2.062, p < 0.05], indicating that relational 
category learning was disrupted more by the relation-centered visual dual task. The 
difference between the featural (M = 307, SD = 368) and relational conditions (M = 611, 
SD = 395) was reliable [t(59) = -3.109, p < 0.01]. No other main effects were statistically 
reliable.  
Response times. I also analyzed these tasks in terms of participants’ mean response times 
on individual. A 2 (dual task) × 2 (category learning task) between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of dual-task [F(1, 57) = 8.007, MSE = 2.669, p < 0.01], indicating 
that response times in the visual dual-task (M = 1.86, SD = 0.68) were longer than those 
in the verbal dual-task (M = 1.43, SD = 0.53). Also, ANOVA showed a reliable main 
effect of category learning [F(1, 57) = 9.829, MSE = 3.277, p < 0.01], indicating that 
feature learning (M = 1.41, SD = 0.17) was faster than relational learning (M = 1.87, SD = 
0.04). Within each dual-task, response times in the relational learning condition were 
reliably longer than the featural learning [for the verbal dual-task, t(28) = -2.239, p < 0.05, 




Experiment 3 has made clear the importance of verbal working memory for 
relational categories, and visual working memory for feature-based categories. I was 
interested in further exploring the cognitive resources of the visual dual-task that included 
more relational information. In Experiment 4, my prediction was that if the visual dual-
task is more involved in the use of relational resources, even if the dual-task is visually 
demanding, the relation-centered visual dual-task would interfere with learning relational 
categories. As predicted, the new visual dual-task more taxed relational categories than 
feature-based categories. The results suggest that the relation-centered visual dual-task 
would consume verbal-based cognitive resources (i.e., attention-demanding). 
Participants’ self-reports also supported the results: Their strategy was that they made the 
sentence like “octagon is larger than hexagon” to memorize the relative size of two 
objects by themselves. The results, in conjunction with the results of Experiment 3, show 
that relational concepts rely heavily on the verbal system based on more attention-
demanding processes, and feature-based concepts rely more on the non-verbal system 
based on more implicit processes, implying the importance of qualitatively different and 









CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION  
The findings presented in this Dissertation make a strong case that not only are 
relational concepts qualitatively different from featural concepts, they are also learned in 
a qualitatively different manner. In particular, the current results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that relational categories are learned by a kind of structured intersection 
discovery—a process that is formally powerful than feature-based associatively learning, 
but which fails catastrophically with probabilistic category structures.  
However, as shown by the results of Experiments 1 and 2, whether a category 
structure is probabilistic—and thus whether concept acquisition must fail 
catastrophically—lies at least in part in the manner in which the learner approaches the 
learning task. Experiment 1, like Jung and Hummel (2009a, b, 2011), showed that 
learning can be improved by structuring the learning task to reveal within-category 
invariants. Jung and Hummel showed that unstated higher-order invariants (such as 
whether the “circle is winning”), can facilitate concept acquisition. Experiment 1 
extended this result, showing that the invariants can come from the hierarchical structure 
of the categories themselves: If the to-be-learned concepts do not possess invariants at the 
nominal (i.e., “basic”) level of categorization, then it can be helpful to learn the 
categories first at a subordinate level of abstraction that does contain invariants 
(Experiment 1b). Having learned the subordinate-level categories, learning that multiple 
subordinate-level concepts belong to the same “basic-level” (i.e., named) concept can be 
accomplished in an associative fashion. 
This finding may help to make sense of the fact that many, or at least some, 
natural relational concepts seem to have a probabilistic structure. For example, “mother” 
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is clearly a relational concept, and yet it is difficult to come up with a single relational 
definition that encompasses all and only instances of “mother” (much like Wittgenstein’s, 
1953, concept of “game”, as discussed shortly). On its face, this fact is troubling for the 
intersection discovery hypothesis, since that hypothesis predicts that there should be no 
probabilistic relational concepts. However, as proposed by Lakoff (1987), the resolution 
of this dilemma may lie in concepts such as mother being polysemous: We have multiple 
(individually deterministic) “mother” schemas unified under a single label. If this 
polysemy-based account of otherwise seemingly probabilistic natural relational concepts 
is correct, then the results of Experiment 1 (especially the results of Experiment 1b 
compared to the results of the subordinate encoding condition of Experiment 1a) suggest 
that we may learn the subordinate-level meanings of mother before we learn to attach the 
label “mother” to all the different concepts to which it can refer. 
This idea of polysemy may even suggest a solution to Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
famous “game” dilemma: Although no one seems able to come up with a single 
definition that includes all games and excludes all non-games—and even though “game” 
would appear, on its face, to be a relational concept—perhaps our failure to come up with 
a satisfactory definition reflects the concept’s polysemy (see Lakoff, 1987). If this 
account is correct, then our understanding of “family resemblance” categories may be 
fundamentally incorrect, or at least incomplete: To say that a concept such as “mother” or 
“game” is a collection of polysemous relational concepts united under a single name is a 
very different claim about the mental representation of concepts than to say that “mother” 
and “game” are simply points in a high-dimensional feature (i.e., vector) space (i.e., a 
“prototype”, or the mean of a collection of points) and that any specific exemplar of 
64 
 
mother or game is simply another point in that space that lies closer to or further from 
that prototype point. 
This claim about the inadequacy of traditional feature-based model of concepts is 
not new. Numerous researchers have argued that relational concepts cannot be adequately 
represented as lists of features, but instead must be mentally represented as relational 
structures such as schemas, theories, or causal models (Gentner, 1983; Holland, Holyoak, 
Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 
2003; Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rehder & Burnett, 2005; Waldmann, Holyoak 
& Fratianne, 1995). This view is supported by evidence from studies of similarity, 
relational reasoning and attention suggesting that relations and features may be 
psychologically distinct (e.g., Barr & Caplan, 1987; Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Kurtz, 
2005; Goldstone, 1996; Logan, 1994; Markman & Stilwell, 2001; Medin, Goldstone & 
Gentner, 1993). At the same time, however, the empirical findings demonstrating 
prototype effects—which are almost universally attributed to feature-based notions of 
conceptual structure—are both numerous and robust (see Murphy, 2002). It remains to be 
seen whether the notion of relational concepts, combined with ideas about the 
hierarchical structure of those concepts, can help to make sense of the kinds of effects 
that would otherwise lead one to conclude that concepts are but lists of features.  
Understanding the roles of features and relations in conceptual structures is 
complicated by the fact that both undoubtedly play a role. The question is not whether 
features or relations serve as the basis of our concepts, but rather how they work together 
to structure and inform our understanding of the world. A reasonable conjecture, 
suggested by numerous findings across the study of both perception and cognition, is that 
65 
 
the mind will use features whenever it can but can also reason about relations whenever it 
must. “Features” can be processed automatically, quickly and effortlessly (for reviews 
see Hummel, 2001; Thoma & Davidoff, 2007) but as reviewed previously, relational 
representations support substantially more sophisticated kinds of inference and 
generalization.  
Consistent with this generalization, Experiments 3 and 4 showed that relational 
category learning imposes a greater working memory load than does featural category 
learning. In the former case it is necessary to actively compute relations and bind them to 
their arguments (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Hummel & Biederman, 1992; 
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003; Oberauer, Suß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007). In contrast, 
featural categories may incur reduced memory load, perhaps by relying on emergent 
perceptual features or implicit learning mechanisms (Ashby & Waldron, 1999; Ward & 
Becker, 1992). 
Kittur et al. (2006b) showed that feature- and relation-based representations also 
seem to support qualitatively different kinds of judgments, with feature-based 
representations supporting familiarity judgments, while relation-based representations 
support “goodness of exemplar” judgments (at least with relationally-defined categories). 
Their findings suggest that these different kinds judgments are the exclusive purview of 
their respective kinds of representations: In their data, stimulus features drove familiarity 
judgments even when relational differences between stimuli were the only basis for 
distinguishing them (i.e., familiarity judgments were at chance when relations, but not 
features, discriminated between stimuli), and relational differences drove “goodness” 
judgments even when features provided the only basis for discrimination. 
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Taken together, these findings suggest a kind of double dissociation between the 
learning and use of featural versus relational representations, which may ultimately 
reflect differences between the representation and processing of implicit features on the 
one hand and explicit relational predicates on the other (see also Hummel, 2001, 2010; 
Thoma & Davidoff, 2007). The findings presented in this Dissertation contribute to the 
literature demonstrating that featural and relational representations are psychologically 
distinct. 
 The results of these studies also help to clarify the circumstances under which 
relational concepts, probabilistic and otherwise, maybe acquired. Comparison across 
exemplars is known to play an important role in the acquisition of relational categories 
(Gentner, Anggoro, & Klibanoff, 2011; Higgins & Ross, 2011; Kurtz, Boukrina, & 
Gentner, 2013). Much of the comparison research involves within-category pairs, 
between-category pairs, or mixed-category pairs, in which exemplars are paired randomly 
regardless of whether they belong to the same or different categories. The results 
presented here suggest that comparisons are likely to be beneficial specifically to the 
extent that they allow learners to discover relational invariants within categories (and 
possibly invariant contrasts between categories)—and that the role of such invariants is 
likely to be much greater for relational concepts (such as those that are crucial for math 
and science education) than for featural ones.  
The current results also suggest that other manipulations used in studies of 
relational learning and reasoning may affect category learning and inference. For 
example, relational responding is decreased when response time is limited, or when the 
richness or featural complexity of the stimuli is increased (Markman & Gentner, 1993a). 
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In contrast, relational responding is increased when people are required to use multiple 
analogs (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983), to perform comparisons 
(Gentner & Namy, 1999), or to provide multiple mappings for a single example 
(Markman & Gentner, 1993b). Further work is needed to explore how such 
manipulations may bias category learning to focus on either featural or relational 
information. 
In summary, the findings presented in this Dissertation contribute to the growing 
body of theoretical and empirical results suggesting that relational thought—the kind of 
thinking that seems to separate us most sharply from our closest primate cousins—is a 
qualitatively different thing than the kinds of thinking and learning afforded by feature-
based representations of the world. They also underscore the fact that the power of 
relational thought comes with attendant costs. Acquiring a relational concept demands 
your full attention (Experiments 3 and 4) and requires you to discover its invariant core 











CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION  
Relational concepts play a central role in human cognition, especially in the most 
uniquely cognitive faculties, such as scientific, mathematical and (abstract) causal 
reasoning, as well as language. However, theoretical considerations and previous 
empirical research suggest that the power of relational concepts comes with a cost: 
namely, that they are much more sensitive to the conditions of acquisition than are 
feature-based concepts.  
The experiments described in this Dissertation investigated two factors that are 
predicted to systematically impair the acquisition of relational concepts relative to 
featural concepts. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated and extended previous findings (e.g., 
Jung & Hummel, 2009, 2011; Kittur et al., 2004, 2006a, b) demonstrating that, although 
featural concepts are easily acquired even when they have a probabilistic structure, 
acquisition of relational concepts fails catastrophically in the face of such structures; that 
is, relational concepts require at least one property to remain invariant over all exemplars 
in order to be learnable. Experiments 3 and 4 used a dual-task paradigm to demonstrate 
that relational and featural concepts are differentially affected relational and featural dual 
tasks, further supporting the conclusion that featural and relational concept acquisition 
rely on qualitatively different mental representations and/or learning algorithms.  
8.1. Summary of Experiments 1 and 2 
One of the most robust findings in the study of category learning is that people 
easily learn categories with a probabilistic structure in which no single feature is shared 
by all members of the category (see Murphy, 2002). However, all the experiments 
demonstrating this phenomenon have used categories defined in terms of their exemplars’ 
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features (see Kittur et al., 2004). To the extent that relational concepts are represented in 
a qualitatively different manner than feature-based concepts (e.g., as schemas, scripts or 
frames, rather than simple lists of features), laws of learning discovered using one kind of 
category may not generalize to concepts based on the other.  
When Kittur at al. (2004, 2006a, b) explored whether the prototype effects so 
often observed with feature-based categories could also be observed with relational 
categories, they found that people have great difficulty learning relational categories with 
probabilistic structures. They interpreted this result in terms of peoples’ attempting to 
learn relational structures through a process of intersection discovery, which retains those 
features and relations exemplars have in common and discards those on which the 
exemplars differ (Doumas et al., 2008; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak, 
2003). Such an approach to learning relational categories will work as long as there is one 
feature or relation shared by all category members, but will fail catastrophically if all 
features and relations are related only probabilistically to category membership. This 
intersection discovery account of relational learning predicts that a relational category 
will be learnable if and only if there exists at least one relation that is present in all 
exemplars of the category. That is, relational categories are learnable iff the intersection 
of the exemplars in not the empty set. The corollary of this prediction is that all and only 
those manipulations that render the intersection non-empty will render the category 
learnable. 
Jung and Hummel (2009a, 2009, 2011) extended the results of Kittur et al. (2004, 
2006a, b) by investigating circumstances that might make it possible to learn relational 
categories with a (putatively) probabilistic structure. Consistent with the intersection 
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discovery hypothesis, they found that the best way to make a probabilistic relational 
category learnable is to structure the learning task in such a way as to render the category 
structure effectively deterministic—i.e., to render the intersection non-empty. 
Experiments 1 and 2 of this Dissertation extended the findings of Jung and Hummel. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that explicit comparison of category 
exemplars can play an important role in the acquisition of relational concepts (see 
Doumas et al., 2008, for a review). Experiment 1 investigated the effects comparison as a 
way to render the empty set non-empty for the purposes of learning otherwise 
probabilistic relational concepts.  
This experiment showed that pairing exemplars of a probabilistic relational 
category (during training) in such a way that members of a pair systematically shared 
relations (i.e., so that the intersection, for the members of that pair, was rendered non-
empty) facilitated category learning and transfer, regardless of whether the paired 
exemplars were explicitly named (subordinate-level condition of Experiment 1a) or not 
(intermediate encoding condition of Experiment 1a), relative to presenting the exemplars 
in isolation (basic baseline condition of Experiment 1a). This effect of pairing was 
enhanced when the training task was ordered in such a way that participants named the 
exemplars at the subordinate level (which contained the invariants) prior to naming them 
at the basic level (which did not; Experiment 1b). This latter effect is consistent with the 
hypothesis (Lakoff, 1987) that seemingly probabilistic relational categories in the world 
(such as mother) are in fact polysemous, with multiple deterministic subordinate-level 
relational concepts (e.g., birth mother, adoptive mother, loving mother, abusive mother, 
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etc.) sharing the same basic-level name. In this way, it is also consistent with the 
fundamental prediction of the intersection discovery hypothesis. 
Experiment 2 examined the conditions under which explicitly presenting the 
prototype of a relational concept (i.e., an exemplar containing all the category-relevant 
relations) might facilitate learning of the exemplars of that concept. The hypothesis was 
that perhaps presenting the prototype would help learners overcome the empty set 
problem by allowing them to learn the exemplars in a rule-plus-exception fashion. This 
experiment showed that providing learners with the prototypes helped them to learn the 
prototypes (not surprisingly), but did not help them to learn the specific exemplars. This 
experiment also investigated the effects of pairing exemplars in a random (rather than 
systematic, as in Experiment 1) fashion. The results showed that random pairings did not 
facilitate leaning relative to presenting single exemplars in isolation. This result implies 
that it is not the effect of comparison, per se, (Experiment 2) that makes probabilistic 
relational category learning possible, but rather the role of comparison in the discovery of 
a useful of invariant (Experiment 1). These results, like those of Experiment 1, add to the 
growing body of support for the prediction that only those manipulations that render the 
intersection non-empty can facilitate the learning of an otherwise probabilistic relational 
concept. 
8.2. Summary of Experiments 3 and 4 
A large body of research on relational thinking has shown that relational tasks 
(such as analogy-making) are more sensitive verbal and relational dual tasks than featural 
tasks are, and than they (relational tasks) are more sensitive to relational than to featural 
dual tasks (see Morrison, 2005). Experiments 3 and 4 aimed to investigate the distinction 
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between feature-and relation-based category learning in terms of their sensitivity to 
different kinds of dual tasks. Experiment 3 revealed an interaction between category 
structures and dual tasks, such that featural category learning was more impaired by a 
visuospatial dual task than by a verbal dual task, whereas relational category learning was 
more impaired by the verbal dual task. When Experiment 4 used a relation-centered 
visual dual task, like the verbal dual task condition, relational category learning was more 
vulnerable to the visual dual task than was featural category learning. Taken together, the 
results suggest that in contrast to featural category learning, which may involve mainly 
non-verbal mechanisms, relational category learning appears to place greater demands on 









































Figure 2.  The subordinate-level condition in Experiment 1a. The left pair shows Fea 
species (basic-level) and Kei Fea (subordinate-level) and the right one shows Fea species 





























Figure 3.  The intermediate encoding condition in Experiment 1a. The left figures shows 
the pair of [0, 1, 1, 1] and [1, 0, 1, 1], and the right one shows the pair of [1, 1, 0, 1] and 







































































































































































































































































































































        














Figure 12. The prototype condition in Experiment 2. The bug in the left side is the 


























Figure 13. The two different exemplars condition in Experiment 2. They belong to the 



































Figure 14. The two same exemplars condition in Experiment 2. Two bugs belong to the 






















Figure 15. The subordinate baseline condition and basic baseline condition in 



























































































































































































































































Figure 21. Three relevant properties in the featural condition in Experiment 3: Category 
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Figure 22. Three relevant properties in the relational condition in Experiment 3: Category 
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                            Figure 26. Trials to criterion by dual task in Experiment 4 
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